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Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 3-23,
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FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 3-10

[Article by Col T. Kondratkov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "The 25th CPSU Congress on the Ideological Struggle of the Two Systems"]

[Text] The ideological struggle in the international arena today has reached unprecedented scope and intensity. It has become truly global. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, the problems of this struggle are increasingly becoming paramount problems.¹ In the struggle between the two philosophies "there is no place for neutrality and compromises."²

With the growing strength of world socialism and critical development of the general crisis of the capitalist system the most reactionary circles in the imperialist countries are trying to poison the international atmosphere, spur on the arms race, and undermine the position of the socialist community and revolutionary and liberation forces. Increasingly sophisticated ideological sabotage and the kindling of anticommunist, anti-Soviet hysteria have been typical of the recent subversive actions of imperialist reactionaries. The reactionary ideologists and propagandists, as well as various kinds of opportunists, are trying to discredit the theory and practice of socialism and stop our advance toward communism.

In the struggle against bourgeois, Maoist, and revisionist ideology, Marxism-Leninism is intensifying its attack, winning over millions upon millions of new followers on all continents. Its influence on sociopolitical processes, international relations, and the thinking and creative activities of the popular masses is steadily growing. Marxist-Leninist ideology is the foundation of the strategy and tactics of the communist and worker parties. The entire course of history and revolutionary experience strongly affirms the correctness and great vitality of Marxism-Leninism. That is exactly why the apologists of imperialism are taking up arms against it.

The ideological struggle of the two systems is spreading to all spheres of the life of the various classes, parties, and state. It permeates all forms of social consciousness and influences the worldview and psychology of the masses. The principles of peaceful co-existence cannot be applied in ideological struggle. This struggle follows the law revealed by V. I. Lenin, who said, "There is only one way to put the question: bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle ground."³

The spiritual makeup of millions of Soviet people has changed fundamentally during the profound socioeconomic and political transformations of the last 61 years in our country, which have been focused in the new USSR Constitution, and through the enormous indoctrination work of the party and state. The scientific materialist worldview and the psychological traits of collectivism and imperialism have become firmly entrenched in their consciousness. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev points out, "As the result of merging the different forms of socialist property, gradually eliminating the significant differences between town and country and mental and physical labor, and the adoption by all working people of the ideological-political positions of the working class, the real interests and objectives, social ideals, and psychological characteristics of all strata of the population in our country are closer than ever before."⁴

The profound ideological conviction and high morale of the Soviet people and their fighting men are manifested in both peaceful and military labor. The Great Patriotic War showed this especially clearly. In bloody fighting and on the labor front Soviet people demonstrated their best qualities: boundless devotion to the Motherland, party, and ideals of communism; loyalty to the military oath; insurmountable persistence; unbending will to victory; courage, bravery, and mass heroism; a high level of military skill. In his book "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land], L. I. Brezhnev called the fighting men of our army and navy "heroes of the spirit."⁵ Workers in the rear were the same. This was one of the important sources of the victory of the USSR and its Armed Forces over German fascism and Japanese militarism.

The importance of the spiritual factor, of ideology, increases immeasurably under conditions of developed socialism. Marxist-Leninist ideology, deeply entering the consciousness of the people, has become a key regulator of their behavior and activities, an effective means of controlling social processes, and a stimulator of progress in all sectors of the economy and in building up the defensive might of the USSR and countries of the socialist community.

Marxist-Leninist ideology has a greater role today as a means of repulsing the propaganda attacks of imperialism and exposing its ideological sabotage.

Without a scientific ideology, the strategists of imperialism concentrate their propaganda efforts not on the theoretical level, but chiefly at the level of the everyday consciousness of the masses, where old views, conservative habits, and various superstitions and prejudices are most deeply rooted. It is precisely here that their propaganda tries to gain a foothold for its pernicious influence, to cultivate opinions and ideas that are advantageous to it, and to introduce bourgeois norms of human behavior.

To achieve these goals the theoreticians of capitalism have worked out appropriate forms and methods of psychological influence on the population and on army and navy personnel. They have formulated a kind of "psychological strategy," a means of waging psychological war, which has become a crucial component of the political and military strategy of the imperialist countries. It has outgrown national boundaries and spread to the entire "Atlantic community" and imperialism's other military-political blocs.

The psychological strategy of capitalism is also used as a weapon to disunite the socialist countries and weaken their moral-political potential. Subversive propaganda, ideological sabotage, deliberate lies, slander, and other foul means are employed for this purpose.

To counter bourgeois ideology, which distorts the ratio between ideology and psychology (diminishing the former by elevating the latter), Marxism-Leninism solves this problem from a truly scientific standpoint, revealing their true role in the spiritual development of a person. It demands first of all that a scientific worldview be developed as the foundation of all spiritual qualities, including psychological traits, and that the imperialist, Maoist, and revisionist strategy of psychological and ideological warfare be resolutely exposed.

II

The efforts of imperialist ideology and propaganda, coordinated on an international scale, are concentrated on holding back the progressive trends of the present day, achieving an "erosion of communism," creating favorable conditions for the capitalist world in the ideological struggle, and rehabilitating its aggressive policy and strategy. By intensive ideological, propaganda pressure the imperialists are trying to dull the consciousness of the masses, form bourgeois opinions, psychological characteristics, interest, standards, and habits in them, and keep them in spiritual slavery. They have built an enormous propaganda system for this purpose. Every hour, day and night, the working people of almost the entire globe are subjected to it to one degree or another.

Imperialist ideology and propaganda carries on particularly broad attacks against the Soviet Union. Forty foreign radio stations broadcast more than 250 hours a day to the USSR.⁶

Anticommunism is the principal ideological-political weapon of imperialism. It takes the most varied forms, from crude and primitive to refined and sophisticated. Anticommunism is the foundation of the foreign policy line of the United States and those imperialist countries that travel in its wake.

One of the forms of anticommunism is the package of social, foreign policy, and military strategic doctrines and theoretical ideas supplied for anticommunist, anti-Soviet propaganda by the far-flung network of imperialism's ideological establishment: the research corporations, institutes, and the like. In the United States alone 150 organizations and more than 200 university departments are engaged in collection of information and analysis of the situation in various areas of life in the Soviet Union. West Germany has more than 100 such ideological centers.⁷ They are all producing ideological myths that discredit everything that is advanced and progressive.

The chief content of all the varieties of anticommunism — militant, moderate, cautious, and concealed — is malicious slander against real socialism, falsification of the politics and goals of the communist parties, and distortion of Marxist-Leninist theory. All the enemies of social progress, from aggressive imperialist circles to the Maoist leadership in Beijing, have united under the black banner of anticommunism. "Imperialist propaganda," the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work" published on 6 May 1979 emphasizes, "and the propaganda of the Beijing chauvinists and aggressors is openly cooperating with it today, continuously wages a furious attack on the minds of Soviet people, attempting with the most sophisticated methods and modern technical equipment to poison their awareness of Soviet reality with slander, discredit socialism, and dress up imperialism with its plundering, inhuman policies and practices. Therefore, one of the crucial challenges of ideological indoctrination and information work is to help Soviet people recognize the full mendacity of this slanderous propaganda, to expose its treacherous methods in clear, concrete, and convincing form."^{7a}

The ideology of anticommunism is deeply reactionary, counterrevolutionary, pseudoscientific, and completely permeated with pessimism. It is convincing evidence of the intellectual degradation of imperialism. That is why its zealots are trying to give it a new look, putting their emphasis on "human rights." Z. Brzezinski, assistant to the U. S. President for questions of national security, has stated that "human rights" should replace traditional anticommunism as the "foundation on which the foreign policy of the United States is built."⁸ The supposed defense of "human rights" has been raised to the rank of current state policy in the United States. This campaign is an ideological maneuver aimed primarily at the socialist countries and the world communist and worker movement.

International imperialism is trying to use the Zionists to wage anti-communist propaganda. Specifically, in the last decade the Zionists have conducted annual campaigns of provocation under false slogans of

protest against the "persecution of Jews in the USSR," "violations of human rights," and the like. Zionist organizations are active in about 70 countries of the world.⁹

The struggle against anticommunism is an inseparable part of the overall struggle of the communist and worker parties and all progressive forces for peace, democracy, socialism, and communism. It is waged constantly, systematically, and aggressively. The Berlin Conference of European Communist and Worker Parties stressed: anticommunism has been and remains a weapon of imperialist and reactionary forces in their struggle not only against communists but also against other democrats and democratic liberties. The progressive forces of the entire world are determinedly exposing the misanthropic essence of imperialist ideology and policies.

Simultaneously with anticommunist propaganda of unprecedented scope among the population and armed forces of NATO and other military-political groupings, the apologists of capitalism are intensifying their praise of the capitalist way of life and bourgeois democracy. They use every means possible to dress up the bourgeois economic and sociopolitical order and conceal its ulcers in order to deceive the masses. They devise supposedly scientific propositions and dream up more acceptable names for the system: "popular capitalism," "industrial society," and "technotronic society."

Despite the vast scale of the propaganda, it is not giving its organizers the desired results. Therefore, they are also making intensive use of the ideology of nationalism, chauvinism, and racism, which imperialists used before to prepare and unleash two world wars as well as numerous local wars and armed conflicts. This ideological weapon is now used to eclipse the class consciousness of the working masses and to set certain peoples against others, to kindle conflict between them.

The book "Racial Ideologies" by West German sociologist P. Muelken emphasizes that racial theories are reflected in party programs, influence the content of various magazine and book publishing houses, and are used to substantiate political and economic goals and to justify racial prejudice and killing.

The roots of racism are concealed in the capitalist system itself, in which inequality and exploitation of one person by another are inherent. Experience teaches that only socialism frees people from all forms of oppression, racial oppression among them. Equality of citizens before the law regardless of nationality and racial affiliation has been put in the constitutions of the socialist countries and is guaranteed by the entire way of life of socialist society.

As for nationalism, which is closely allied to racism, it is also assessed by current bourgeois theoreticians as "one of the strongest ideologies in the world." The ideology of nationalism is multifaceted. Within it we can distinguish, first, the nationalism of

oppressed nations and peoples, which is usually directed against imperialist oppression and plays a definite, progressive role. In the second place, we have the nationalism of oppressing nations which is reactionary because it upholds oppression. It is this variation of nationalism, in particular chauvinism and racism, that imperialist propaganda uses first to seduce the population and army and navy personnel.

Nationalism, chauvinism, and racism permeate the sociopolitical and ideological atmosphere of the capitalist lands. Evidence of this is seen in the outbursts of white nationalism, chauvinism, and racism in the United States, the activation of revanchistes and neo-Nazis in West Germany, the rebirth of militarism in Japan, the unprecedented rowdiness of the Zionists, and the savagery of the South African racists. Great Han nationalism has taken on a dangerous form. It is being used by the Beijing rulers, who are raging enemies of international detente and the cause of peace, to arouse hatred for the peoples of the socialist community and to promote their far-reaching hegemonistic and expansionist goals.

The ideology of nationalism and racism in all its manifestations is meeting growing resistance from the working masses, who have learned its pernicious nature from the experience of two world wars. The Marxist-Leninist ideology of internationalism is winning the battle of ideas. It proclaims and defends the equality of all peoples and nations and rejects every form of national and socialist oppression. It determinedly exposes nationalism no matter how it may be dressed. "It is precisely nationalistic tendencies," L. I. Brezhnev emphasizes, "and in particular those which take the form of anti-Sovietism, that bourgeois ideologists and bourgeois propaganda use most readily today in the struggle against socialism and the communist movement."¹⁰

Clericalism, the reactionary political and ideological movement that aims to bolster the role of the clergy in the life of the capitalist countries, occupies an important place in the ideological-political arsenal of the monopoly capitalists. It is headed by the ruling cliques of the Catholic and Protestant churches. The armed forces of the NATO bloc have succumbed to clericalism. The book "Verteidigung im Bündnis" [Defense in the Alliance] alleges that 96 percent of Bundeswehr personnel have been afflicted by the drug of religion.¹¹

The ideology of social reformism is a reliable support for the imperialist bourgeoisie in the ideological struggle with Marxism-Leninism. The right wing of the Social Democrats has broken with scientific socialism and taken a bourgeois position. "Our line with respect to the Social Democrats," L. I. Brezhnev points out, "is perfectly clear. We are waging and will continue to wage a struggle against our ideological and political enemies from the standpoint of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time we favor cooperation and unified actions with those who are truly ready to fight against imperialism, for peace, and for the interests of the working people."¹²

Contemporary revisionism is an active accomplice of monopoly capital in the ideological struggle of the two worlds. It is trying to discredit Marxism-Leninism, declare it outdated, and replace it with various kinds of petty bourgeois ideas. The right revisionists have advanced the model of "humane socialism." Under the guise of "improving" socialism they are preaching a rejection of it and fighting for restoration of capitalist ways in the socialist countries. Bourgeois propaganda is also making extensive use of "Eurocommunism." The "left" revisionists put forward "superrevolutionary" slogans and push the masses toward risky, unprincipled actions while their parties engage in sectarianism.

The ideology of Maoism is a serious threat to international peace and security. Following it, the present Beijing leadership categorically opposes any steps to further the process of detente, limit the arms race, and strengthen world peace. It is carrying on propaganda of unprecedented scope proclaiming the fatal inevitability of a new world war, stepping up militarization of the country, modernizing the Chinese war machine, and carrying on intensive ideological indoctrination of the population and armed forces personnel to carry out their expansionist plans.

Maoist propaganda conceals the true sources of the danger of war. Attempting to thwart the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to strengthen international peace and security and maliciously distorting the truth, Maoist propaganda says that this threat comes from these countries, not from imperialism. The Maoists call for the formation of a "united front" with participation by imperialist circles and world reactionaries to fight against all the forces who support peace, international security, national independence, and social progress.

China's aggression against socialist Vietnam "illustrates once again how irresponsible Beijing is toward world destiny."^{12a}

The many different theories of warfare: sociopolitical, psychological, biological, pluralistic, and others, are an important ideological weapon of imperialist, Maoist, and revisionist propaganda. Their adherents immortalize armed force and declare it to be the dominant factor of all socioeconomic systems. Examples of this are the books "Roots of War" and "The Giants: Russia and America" by American sociologist R. Barnett.¹³

The Soviet Armed Forces are one of the principal targets of purposeful ideological sabotage by imperialism. Bourgeois propaganda maliciously distorts the history of the birth and development of our Armed Forces, their historic purpose, and social role and uses the "Soviet threat of war" to frighten people. The slanderous article on the Soviet Army and Navy run by the West German military theory journal *EUROPÄISCHE WEHRKUNDE* may serve as an example of this type of propaganda.¹⁴

Bourgeois, Maoist, and revisionist propaganda is stepping up its activities on the ideological front and waging a continuous attack on

the consciousness of the masses, attempting to subjugate the common people. Under these conditions, aggressive struggle against hostile ideology and propaganda for the ideas of Marxism-Leninism are called upon to protect our people and their fighting men against alien ideological influences and to create an insurmountable barrier to the penetration of ideological and psychological aggression by the doomed capitalist world.

III

The 25th CPSU Congress devoted a great deal of attention to questions of the ideological indoctrination of Soviet people and development of the new type of human being, the worthy builder of communism and stalwart defender of the Motherland. This is a result of both the challenges of a developed socialist society and the problems of the contemporary ideological struggle between the two world systems. Our party structures communist indoctrination, like all its revolutionary transforming activity, on the firm foundation of Marxism-Leninism. This is a complex multifaceted process that requires a comprehensive approach, that is, close integration of ideological-political, labor, and moral indoctrination. It presupposes above all the formation in the Soviet people and their fighting men of a scientific worldview which arms them with a knowledge of the laws of development of society, strengthens their faith in the righteousness and invincibility of the cause of socialism and communism, and enables them to correctly understand events within the country and in the international arena. Such a worldview gives a conscious, substantiated quality to people's action, lays a solid foundation for communist ideological loyalty, and acts as a powerful shield against the ideological and psychological attacks of the enemy. Marxism-Leninism offers a truly scientific, dialectical materialistic worldview and, as the 25th party congress pointed out, study of this worldview by the masses of people is a "crucial characteristic of the development of social consciousness in the current phase."¹⁵

Indoctrination also presupposes the formation of a communist attitude toward labor in our people and fighting men. Labor for the good of society is the sacred obligation of every person.

Moral indoctrination plays an important part in the spiritual improvement of the Soviet people and army and navy fighting men. Our entire socialist way of life inculcates moral qualities. Indoctrination work, inculcating in people's consciousness the norms and rules of behavior recorded in the moral code of the builder of communism, is a strong influence on this process. At the 25th CPSU Congress Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "Nothing elevates the individual as much as an active posture in life, a conscious attitude toward public duty, where unity of word and deed become the everyday norm of behavior. It is the job of moral indoctrination to produce this posture."¹⁶

It is very important to indoctrinate the people and fighting men in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism. Soviet patriotism, inspired by the scientific worldview, lofty political goals, and moral ideals, is an inexhaustible source of labor and military heroism. Patriotism and love for the Motherland are inseparably bound up with proletarian, socialist internationalism, which permeates all the intentions and actions of the Soviet people and their fighting men. The defensive coalition of socialist states known as the Warsaw Pact Organization was formed on this basis and reliably serves the interests of socialism, peace, and progress.

Explaining their rights and obligations to Soviet citizens and developing their understanding that socialist laws must be observed strictly is an inseparable part of communist indoctrination. The USSR Constitution says that all state agencies and officials, public organizations, and citizens are charged with the duty to observe socialist laws. Especially high demands are made of military men to carry out the regulations as well as the orders and instructions of commanders and senior officers.

As the November 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized, the duty of ideological workers is to improve the quality and efficiency of their work, refine forms and methods of this work, and, as required by the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work," "oppose the subversive political and ideological activity of the class enemy and his malicious slander of socialism with the invincible solidarity and mighty ideological unity of our ranks, the profound conviction and political vigilance of every Soviet citizen, our readiness to defend the Motherland and the revolutionary gains of socialism."^{16a} Maximum effort must be put into every indoctrinational activity in order to produce the maximum effect. Only then will this work help Soviet fighting men develop high political consciousness, revolutionary vigilance, and intolerance of the slightest evidence of foreign ideology. Soldiers are made, not born, as the saying goes. Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Ministry of Defense and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, observes, "This development will be faster when the quality of training and indoctrination is higher and when the conditions of exercises, flights, and cruises are closer to actual battle conditions."¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

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6. MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN' 1977, No 9, p 197.
7. Larin, V., "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya i Ideologicheskaya Bor'ba (60-70-e Gody)" [International Relations and the Ideological Struggle (1960's and 1970's)], Moscow, Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn', 1936, p 92.
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15. "Materialy....," op. cit., p 74.
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17. "60 Let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR. Dokumenty i Materialy" [Sixty Years of the USSR Armed Forces. Documents and Materials), Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 35.

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WARTIME LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF 4TH TANK ARMY DESCRIBED

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[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Maj-Engr B. Shcherbakov: "Logistical Support of the 4th Tank Army in the Visla-Oder Operation"]

[Text] During the Visla-Oder operation the 1st Ukrainian Front, which delivered the main strike in the Breslau axis, consisted of eight combined arms armies, two tank armies (the 3rd Guards and 4th), an air army, three tank corps, one mechanized corps, and one cavalry corps. The tank armies made up the front's mobile group and were designated to develop success at the operational depth. They had to overcome the enemy's defense from the Visla to the Oder to a depth of more than 500 kilometers.

The Fourth Tank Army, commanded by Col Gen D. D. Lelyushenko, had two corps (the 10th Tank and 6th Guards Mechanized corps) and detached units and formations subordinate to the army and for reinforcement. There were 42,868 men, 752 tanks and self-propelled guns, 609 field guns and mortars, and 3,914 motor vehicles¹. The army rear had to supply a large amount of machinery (with ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and the like) and a large number of personnel (with food).

In December 1944 the 4th Tank Army began concentrating in the Visla springboard 15-20 kilometers west of Sandomierz, behind formations of the 13th Army. The army's rear units and institutions (hereafter called simply "rear units" — author) were deployed on the east bank of the Visla. The army rear, commanded by Col A. K. Yarkov, included: a field army supply depot (with 14 supply dumps), a field hospital base (four hospitals), three detached vehicle transport battalions (freight capacity of 1,269 tons), and other means.² The rear units were at 92 percent (3,828 men) of full personnel strength.³

The army rear had considerably more time to organize for the offensive than it had in other operations because the forces of the 1st Ukrainian Front had reached the Visla much earlier, in the first half of August 1944. Direct preparations for the offensive began in late December when orders were received from the front commander.

The rear units of the army were grouped in conformity with the concept of the operation. The condition of vehicular roads and railroads, nature of the terrain, and other probable conditions of the arrangement of rear agencies in the zone of the offensive were taken into account here. Rear units of the army were based at three railroad stations: Nisko and Ozet (unloading stations) and Chmielnów (supply station). The field army supply depot with its storehouses was set up near them. The directorate of the depot was located at Chmielnów Station. The supply stations were 30-35 kilometers from the assembly regions of the army formations. To provide better supply of essential articles to the troops, the field army depot set up an advanced department at the spring-board with stocks of the primary types of materiel stored on the ground. A mobile supply of ammunition for tanks and self-propelled guns was organized on 30 trucks, which went into the breakthrough with the combat units.

The army had 3,223 trucks with which to deliver supplies of materiel. Of these trucks only 314 (9.7 percent) were in the army transport element (the 36th, 283rd, and 643rd detached vehicle battalions). With an average staffing ratio of 69 percent and a technical readiness coefficient for means of transportation of 0.94 the vehicle battalions could handle 60-65 percent of the volume of shipping envisioned in the operation.⁴ Considering this, the directorate of the army rear made provision to use the vehicles of units and formations during the offensive to transport materiel "for themselves," both from the field supply depot and from the front storehouses.

Rear agencies had to overcome additional difficulties in accumulating food stores. The Military Council of the Army decided to establish a 20-day, minimum permitted food reserve by the start of the operation. The army procured it with its own forces from local resources in Kamenets-Podol'skaya Oblast and other regions at significant distances (250-500 kilometers) from the troops. This required the involvement of large numbers of men and equipment from the units and formations. A further difficulty was connected with the fact that food procurement was carried on during the period of intensive preparation of the army rear for the forthcoming operation. Rail and vehicle transport worked at high intensity. Increased stores were established among the troops first. By the start of the operation these stores had reached a 10-day supply. The field supply depot received part of its meat and animal fat from the rear of the front.

The delivery of materiel to the forward departments of army storehouses was done only at night, and with careful concealment. As a result, the average daily trip of vehicle transport was no more than 110-120 kilometers. Despite the difficulties, stocks of materiel were brought up close to the troops and the first echelon of the army rear was moved to the west bank of the Vistula on time and without losses.





Figure: The Movement of Rear Units and Institutions During the Vielsbuder Operation of the 4th Tank Army

[See key, next page]

[Key to figure on preceding page]

- (a) Mobile Surgical Field Hospital;
- (b) Department of the Hospital for Lightly Wounded;
- (c) Unloading Station;
- (d) Supply Station;
- (e) Army (Food) Storehouse;
- (f) Department of Army Storehouse;
- (g) Sanitary-Epidemiological Detachment;
- (h) Road Company;
- (i) Bath and Laundry Detachment;
- (j) Field Truck Bakery;
- (k) Third Guards Army;
- (l) Fourth Tank Army;
- (m) Thirteenth Army;
- (n) Fifth-Second Army;
- (o) Headquarters of the Field Supply Depot of the 4th Tank Army;
- (p) Second Echelon of the Control Point of the 4th Tank Army.

By the beginning of the operation the army rear formed stocks of materiel in the following amount: 3.2 battle scales of ammunition for tank weapons, 2.5-3.3 for artillery weapons, and 3.0 for rifles; 4.9 refuelings of diesel fuel and 3.8 of gasoline; up to 20 days of food rations.⁵ It should be observed that materiel supplies, with the exception of fuel and lubricants, corresponded to planned amounts and met troop needs. As for supply of fuel and lubricants, they were lower than planned. For example, KB-70 aviation fuel was at 60 percent of the plan, gasoline was 90 percent, and diesel fuel was 77 percent. The reason for this was not so much the lack of tanks, which were not completely supplied to the front, as it was the shortening of the preparation period by eight days in connection with a change in the beginning of the operation. As is common knowledge, Supreme High Headquarters moved the offensive from 20 to 12 January 1945 in order ease the extremely difficult situation of the Allies in the West which had resulted from the counteroffensive of German fascist troops in the Ardennes.

The army rear was divided into two echelons to increase maneuverability, organize timely hauling of materiel, and improve troop supply during the operation. The first echelon, which traveled with the second echelon of the army field headquarters included a vehicle transport battalion, one fuel and lubricant store, an ammunition dump, and a medical supply store, two mobile field surgical hospitals, a department of the hospital for lightly wounded, a sanitary-epidemiological detachment, and a field truck bakery (see figure). The second echelon comprised the remaining army rear units. The work of the army rear during the operation was planned in "leap-frog" steps.

To insure precise and uninterrupted control of rear units and institutions, rear headquarters created an operational group which became part of the first echelon of the field headquarters of the army. It included an officer from rear headquarters, who was senior officer of the group, one or two signal officers, and one officer from each of the

rear branches and the artillery weapons service. The group disposed of part of the basic materiel. Its principal objective was to keep the chief of staff and operational branch of the army informed concerning the rear situation and receive information on the combat situation from them. In addition they had to maintain an operational map and report changes in the combat and rear situation in the formations to rear headquarters.

The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went onto the offensive in the Sandomierz springboard on 12 January. On the very first day, after the forces of the assault group broke through the enemy's first and second positions, the front commander brought both tank armies into the battle to complete the break through the main zone of defense quickly and, cooperating with combined arms armies, wipe out the enemy's operational reserves.

The advance of units and formations of the 4th Tank Army developed successfully. Army rear agencies and means were echeloned in the operational depth in the following order: battalion rears moved behind combat subunits while the rears of brigades and corps were divided into two echelons, as also done in the army. In this case the first echelon of the brigade and corps rears (medical posts, part of the supplies of fuel, lubricants, and ammunition carried in trucks) as well as repair and evaluation means were located near the command posts, while the second echelons were in the region of the rear control points.

The first echelon of the army rear traveled behind the troops and worked on direct support and supply for them. The group of rear units was not tied to the railroad. It was usually located in the area of the second echelon of army field headquarters or near it. The movement of the first echelon of the rear depended on the rate of advance of the units and subunits: the faster they moved, the less time rear units spent in one place. For example, during the swift advances of 17-19 and 21-22 January the rear units moved each day (see figure). However, this does mean that all rear units moved to new regions simultaneously. This depended on the nature and scope of the support and supply missions they were performing for combat units. Thus, in the 15 days of the operation army field artillery store No 3115 moved five times, while field bakery No 385 moved nine times and mobile field surgical hospital No 5251 moved just twice.

Because of the considerable damage to railroad lines no new army unloading station was assigned until the formations reached the Oder. Materiel and rear units were moved entirely by vehicle transport. It should be observed that toward the end of the operation the availability of vehicle transport in the army did not decrease at all, but increased slightly (by one percent). Repair subunits fixed up vehicles very quickly. In January, for example, army repair units repaired 924 vehicles, 235 of which were moderately large jobs and 37 major overhauls.⁶ The size of the vehicle fleet was also increased through captured vehicles.

During the operation the army used 2,113 tons (about 130 freight cars) of ammunition of all types, which was roughly 1.1 battle scale or 37 percent of the total stock of ammunition established by the beginning of the operation.⁷ Thanks to the hard work of artillery supply branches and the comparatively small amount of ammunition used under conditions of the successful advance by troops, the formations of the army did not experience a shortage of ammunition. In practice the troops had all the ammunition they needed accumulated at their starting positions. The ammunition that was supplied to them was used primarily to refill mobile reserves upon completion of the operation. The level of availability of ammunition for the primary calibers to troops of the army during the operation did not drop below one battle scale. At the end of the operation, the army had between 2.0 and 3.2 battle scales of 76-, 85-, 100-, and 122-millimeter shells and was capable of performing any new mission.

Fuel and lubricants, especially diesel fuel and gasoline, constituted a large part of army requirements. During the operation the army used up 1,234 tons of diesel fuel and 1,758 tons of gasoline.⁸ On the eighth day of combat the formations and units of the army were already experiencing a critical need for fuel.

Given the high rate of advance, extension of lines of communication, impossibility of using demolished railroads to ship freight, and inadequate number of trucks for shipping fuel and lubricants, the fuel supply branch was unable to get the necessary amount of diesel fuel and gasoline to the combat units quickly. As a result army formations were frequently forced to stop and wait for fuel. Under these conditions combat was waged only by particular subunits and units which were given all the fuel remaining from the tanks and self-propelled guns of other brigades and battalions. For example, between 19 and 24 January (six days, which was roughly one-third of the length of the operation), army formations waged combat actions with limited forces because of the shortage of fuel.⁹ The use of captured fuel (but not much was captured) made it possible to supply some gasoline to some units in certain stages of the operation, but this did not have a significant impact on fuel supply to the formations.

The lack of timely fuel supply, above all gasoline, affected the operational structure of the army and its rate of advance. The army war diaries stressed: "The scarcity of fuel caused an exceptionally uneven advance by the army. The best-supplied forward detachment of the army, the 93rd Detached Brigade and the 22nd self-propelled artillery brigade, advanced most rapidly until they reached the approaches to the Oder River; the other formations of the army advanced in hops, as fuel and lubricants were delivered to them. Because of the shortage of fuel the army approached the Oder in a formation that did not fit the situation... and was unable to send anything but one tank brigade into the fight to attempt to cross the river on the run."¹⁰ It is revealing that by the end of the operation army troops had just 0.1-0.4 refuelings of gasoline and 0.8 refuelings of diesel fuel.

The average daily food requirement of the army was 85 tons. At the beginning of the operation it was supplied from food stores and their temporary forward departments. As units advanced and captured a large amount of food from the enemy the army was able to feed its troops with captured rations. The need to move the food supply depots and their temporary stations disappeared, and they remained in place until the end of the operation. The chief of rear services organized captured food stores based on supplies seized from the enemy and used them to provide all essentials to the units and formations of the army.

The operation was carried out in a region with a well-developed highway network, but the railroads were almost completely wiped out. This made it necessary to haul materiel significant distances in trucks and complicated the organization of technical, medical, and other types of support.

All shipping from the starting line during the operation was done by motor vehicles. Loads were carried from the supply station to the advance departments of the army stores by army trucks and beyond that, to corps and brigade stores, by army and troop transport in parallel. Army transport accounted for 72 percent of the 18,166 tons of freight hauled, troop transport handled 22.5 percent, and front transport handled just 5.5 percent.¹¹ These figures show graphically the intensive work of army vehicle transport and inadequate help from the front in hauling army materiel during the operation.

The critical situations that arose in supplying units and formations of the army demanded resourceful, enterprising decisions by commanders and a high level of organizational activity by staffs. Experience with the use of captured rolling stock in certain rail sectors deserves attention, for example. During the period from 28 January to 2 February 1945 rear chief Col A. K. Yarkov used railroad transport coupled with helicopters to haul fuel and lubricants. This made it possible to overcome breakdowns in supply and speed up the transfer of the headquarters of the army field supply depot and all its primary stores to the Wlenzig-Ravicz region.

On 3 February 1945 when troops reached the Oder, the Visla-Oder Operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front ended with the capture of a beachhead and the seizure of the Silesian industrial region. During this operation personnel of the rear units of the 4th Tank Army demonstrated courage, bravery, and heroism. The fighting men did their best to give combat units everything they needed, to do everything possible to wipe out the German fascist troops and bring the day of victory nearer. Military vehicle troops faced especially large jobs and many of them operated successfully in a difficult situation.

For example, a vehicle column of the 36th Detached Vehicle Battalion consisting of 20 vehicles under the command of Captain Pugachev made a difficult trip from Zlochev in L'vovskaya Oblast through Ozet to Schilberg. The trucks traveled 960 kilometers to deliver the necessary fuel and ammunition to the tank troops. During the operation Private Pritupa drove his ZIS-5 truck 200-220 kilometers a day carrying 57 tons. For courage and heroism demonstrated in this fighting 30 soldiers

and officers of vehicle battalions of the 4th Tank Army received government awards.¹²

The experience of the combat actions of the 4th Tank Army in the Visla-Oder Operation demonstrated that bringing stocks of materiel as close as possible to the troops at the start makes it possible to greatly reduce the transport and evacuation leg and create more favorable conditions for support of formations and units during the operation.

Because the offensive developed at a high rate, up to 40-50 kilometers a day, and the enemy had disabled the railroads, the group of units of the second rear echelon of the army, which was located near the supply stations, did not move until the end of the operation; it stayed at its former place. Therefore, materiel and wounded had to be evacuated fairly long distances, often along unprepared lines of communication. This led to breakdown in logistic support to the troops.

During the operation formations of the army sometimes suffered fuel shortages, and at certain moments trucks and tanks had to stop and wait for fuel and lubricants to be delivered. This unquestionably had a negative effect on the results of troop combat actions and slowed down the rate of advance.

The experience of the Visla-Oder Operation shows that the success of actions by a tank army deep within the defense depended significantly on timely and correctly organized delivery of materiel, especially fuel. The fighting effectiveness of the army and its rate of advance, particularly in the final stage of the operation, were largely determined by the availability of fuel in the combat units. Therefore, not only the army command but also the front command took every possible step to see that the advancing tank and mechanized formations had a continuous supply of fuel.

Despite the high rate of advance and abrupt changes in the operational and rear situations, control of the rear and communication among rear units were generally carried on without interruption. The first echelon of the army rear was located in regions that insured convenient control of rear services, checks on timely transport of materiel, and performance of other activities related to logistic, technical, and medical troop support. The basic characteristic of this work was that units were in one place for just a short time. For example, during the operation the first echelon of the army rear moved eight times and the length of its stays in each of the regions (see figure) ranged from one to four days. The movement of the army rear was planned in advance and refined during the operation. Moving supplies close to the troops and moving rear units by "leap-frogging" worked very well. Hospitals, branches of mobile truck bakeries, and the vehicle battalion of the army supply store used this procedure especially widely. They often went ahead and took a place in the first echelon of the army rear. The basic principle, keeping rear units as close as possible to the troops and moving the second echelon of army headquarters close to the first, was invariably followed.

During the operation personnel of the army rear gained rich experience in providing units and formations with all types of supplies when troops were operating at great depth, at high speed, and with extended lines of communication. It was found necessary to increase the mobility of the rear of the tank army and reinforce it with vehicle transport.

For skillful combat actions and the courage and heroism of personnel demonstrated during fighting with the German fascist aggressors in the Great Patriotic War, on 17 March 1945 the 4th Tank Army was renamed the 4th Guards Tank Army. Many soldiers of the army, including members of rear units and institutions, received high government awards.

The experience of logistic supply to the 4th Tank Army and the Visla-Order Operation continues to be significant today.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fund 324, inventory 4756, file 137, sheet 4; inventory 4757, file 9, sheets 27-28; fund 326, inventory 214746, file 18, sheet 4.
2. The 4th Tank Army had the following rear units and institutions: the 64th Army Field Supply Depot, 196th Detached Service Company, and 36th, 283rd, and 643rd Detached Vehicle Battalions; stores: 796th Advanced Army Food Store; 1,349th Advanced Army Clothing and Equipment Supply Store, 2,679th and 3,115th Army Field Ammunition Stores, 2,709th Advanced Army Armored Equipment Store, 1,765th Advanced Army Engineer Store, 2,187th and 2,272nd Advanced Army Store Branches, 2,979th Advanced Army Quartermaster Service Store, 2,966th Advanced Army II [expansion unknown] store, 2,974th Advanced Army KhI [expansion unknown] store, 1,6041st SMSI [expansion unknown], 3,230th Grain Store, 3,352nd Captured Equipment and Scrap Metal Store; hospitals: 1,000th Hospital for Lightly Wounded; 5,251st, 5,252nd, and 5,253rd mobile field surgical hospitals; 216th Detached Motorized Medical Platoon, 472nd and 473rd PPPO [expansion unknown], 87th Sanitary-Epidemiological Detachment, and 385th Field Truck Bakery (TsAMO, fund 236, inventory 20930, file 17, sheets 13-16).
3. TsAMO, fund 326, inventory 20930, file 17, sheets 2-20.
4. Ibid., fund 324, inventory 4756, file 144, sheets 63, 91, 105, 198.
5. Ibid., fund 236, inventory 51361, file 20, sheets 1-2.
6. Ibid., fund 324, inventory 4756, file 144, sheets 86-87.
7. Ibid., file 18, sheet 121; inventory 4757, file 9, sheet 184.
8. Ibid., file 144, sheets 142-143.

9. Ibid., inventory 4656, file 138, sheet 30.
10. Ibid., inventory 4756, file 144, sheets 150-151.
11. Ibid., fund 324, inventory 4756, file 144, sheets 86-94.
12. Ibid., sheet 95.

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INFANTRY-ARTILLERY COOPERATION DURING WATER CROSSINGS DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNO-IISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 18-23

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by docent and candidate of historical sciences Col Z. Shutov: "Cooperation Between Infantry (Motorized Infantry) Subunits and Artillery During the Forcing of Water Obstacles"]

[Text] Questions of forcing water obstacles have occupied an important place in the theory and practice of troop combat training in the postwar years. The significance of combat actions involving crossing rivers, lakes, estuaries, reservoirs, canals, and other water obstacles has increased particularly with the adoption of new weapons, above all nuclear missiles. It has become possible to wage an offensive to great depth at a pace several times faster than tank formations advanced during the last war.¹ Under these conditions, crossing water obstacles defended by the enemy has begun to be done during performance of combat missions much more frequently than during the Great Patriotic War. The success of the forcing has depended on the effectiveness of fire suppression of the enemy on the approaches to the river and on the opposite bank. Therefore, maintaining continued cooperation between infantry (motorized infantry) subunits and artillery has become especially important. In each stage of the postwar period the elements of cooperation have depended on the condition of weapons and combat equipment, troop organization, character of the enemy defense, changes in the tactics of offensive battle, crossing procedures, and other factors.

In the first stage of the postwar period, 1945-1953, cooperation between infantry subunits and artillery was influenced by improved weapons. New and modernized guns (the 85-millimeter antitank cannon, the recoilless antitank guns, the 122-millimeter and 130-millimeter cannons, the 152-millimeter howitzer, and others)² had, among other characteristics, greater firing range, which made it possible to prolong support for the combat of infantry subunits on the opposite bank even in cases where fire positions remained on the near bank. In addition, the potential for maneuvering with artillery means and fire increased.

The supplying of new self-propelled and motorized crossing means to engineer troops enabled infantry subunits to cross rivers with T/O and attached artillery. The time from the beginning of the crossing until regimental and battalion artillery groups were on the opposite shore was also reduced.

It should be observed that in the first years after the war the organization and maintenance of cooperation between infantry subunits and artillery when crossing water obstacles was based on the rich experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Upon receiving an order to cross, the battalion commander would adopt a plan and, on the terrain, instruct his own and attached (supporting) subunits concerning the method and order of crossing, procedure for reaching the crossing sector and crossing points, missions of subunits and procedure for cooperation on the opposite bank, and missions of artillery and mortars to cover the crossing and support battalion actions on the opposite bank.

The infantry battalion moving in the first echelon or acting as vanguard (forward detachment) usually received up to one battalion of cannon or howitzer artillery and up to a battalion of antitank artillery as reinforcement.³ In addition it could be reinforced with rocket artillery and mortars. During the war years this was the maximum reinforcement for an infantry battalion, and it only occurred in 1944 and 1945.

The commander of the artillery battalion or battery would receive missions to support a river crossing on the run from the commander of the subunit acting as vanguard (advance or forward detachment) during the approach to the river. Upon reaching the water obstacle the mission was usually refined on the spot.

During the organization of cooperation conducted by the commander of the infantry battalion, the commander of the artillery battalion (battery) had to determine the forward edge of defense and disposition of enemy means of fire and manpower exactly, especially near the crossing point. The observation post of the artillery battalion (battery) commander had to be located together with the observation post of the infantry battalion as close as possible to the river, with a view of the entire crossing segment and enemy defense to the greatest possible depth. Communications were established by radio and wire on order of the artillery battalion (battery) commander and using his means.

The fire positions of the battalion (battery) were to be chosen close to the river bank. Some of the batteries (guns) of the battalion could advance to fire positions for waging direct-laying fire at enemy means of fire located on the opposite bank.

At an exercise the infantry battalion commanded by Major Borshch, operating in the vanguard, reached a river whose opposite bank was defended by the enemy. A strongpoint on a U-shaped hill was the foundation of the defense.

The battalion commander decided to force the river directly opposite the hill, but he planned diversionary actions downstream. The artillery battalion attached to the battalion received the mission of simulating support for a crossing in the diversionary sector, and then supporting the main forces' crossing with concentrated fire from the near bank.

While organizing cooperation the actions of the infantry companies and artillery were carefully matched by time and place and signals were established for target indication and calling in and transferring fire. One battery was assigned to support each company. The battery commanders were put with the commanders of the infantry companies.

At 0200 the diversionary river crossing began and drew the enemy's attention away from the true crossing area. At 0300 the main forces began crossing the river in wooden and inflated boats. Senior Lieutenant Tolstikhin's company made the first trips with mortars and an antitank platoon. With the help of the infantrymen the guns moved into the battle formations of the infantry platoons. Once across the company, supported by concentrated artillery fire, moved ahead well but, carried away by the attack, fell into a pocket of fire prepared by the enemy in advance. For a certain time control of the platoons was lost and cooperation with artillery was disrupted.

The battalion commander, who was still on the near side, immediately crossed the river to the beachhead with the artillery commander. After sizing up the situation, he concentrated artillery fire on the slopes of the hill and brought the company out of the pocket. At the same time Major Borshch decided to envelop the strongpoint on the right with Captain Popov's company and then take the hill with simultaneous attacks from the flank and the front.

When the enveloping company, moving by azimuth, approached the assigned line, the artillery carried out a fire strike against the east slope of the hill. After this the battalion made a determined attack. At the proper time Major Borshch switched the fire of the battalion from the center of the hill to its western slope, to which the enemy was withdrawing.

Making use of the artillery fire, the battalion took the strongpoint and supported the river crossing of the main forces.⁴

As can be seen from the above, attention was concentrated during the first period after the war on cooperation between infantry subunits and artillery. However, the depth to which it was organized and then carried out was limited, as during the Great Patriotic War, to the size of the beachhead being seized and secured.

A qualitatively new phase in the development of the tactics of offensive battle began in 1954, that is, after the Soviet Army adopted nuclear weapons. During this period also, the subunits and units of the Ground Forces were supplied with newer modernized conventional weapons, for example the 122-millimeter howitzer with all-round field of fire, new salvo fire rocket systems (the BM-14 and BM-24), and antitank guided

missiles. However, the nuclear weapon was the chief means of destroying the enemy. It was believed that the use of nuclear weapons could assure the achievement of the decisive objectives of battle more quickly than had been the case during the past war.

It was recognized that destruction of the enemy had to be based on a combination of nuclear weapons and swift action by troops, operating primarily on the run and along axes, without fixed, continuous front lines.

Because crossing water obstacles could take place in the most varied and frequently unforeseen situations, an intermediate procedure between crossing on the run and careful preparation for crossing was devised, crossing after brief preparation.⁵

Cooperation between a motorized infantry battalion and artillery subunit was frequently organized at the same time the missions were formulated. According to exercise experience this was accomplished as follows. The commander of the artillery battalion would report to the infantry battalion commander on the location of the artillery battalion and its provision with personnel, materiel, and ammunition. After receiving the mission from the infantry commander, which was considered one of the principal stages in organization of cooperation, the commander of the artillery subunit would send out reconnaissance to the river. This reconnaissance party usually traveled with the advance party of the infantry battalion. The fire platoons (batteries) traveled in the march column of the infantry battalion behind its lead company.

In order to seize permanent crossings quickly the commander of the artillery subunit would move his guns to open positions to wipe out enemy means of fire with direct-laying fire, knock out enemy cover subunits, and cross the water obstacle quickly together with battalion subunits using the captured crossing.

If the enemy offered strong resistance on the approaches to the river and held on to crossings stubbornly, the artillery subunit was deployed before the battalion reached the obstacle. In this case its fire positions were set as close as possible to the company battle formations. The artillery commander, located with the infantry battalion commander, would receive a refined mission and instructions on cooperation. The infantry commander announced the order of artillery preparation for the attack, indicated the targets to be destroyed with nuclear weapons, distributed them for suppression and destruction among guns, tanks, and self-propelled artillery guns, and set the exact time and order of performance of the mission by each means of fire.⁶ Cooperation was organized in greatest detail for the period of forcing the river and attacking the designated objectives.

In those cases where there was not enough time to organize cooperation, the infantry commander would coordinate the efforts of the motorized infantry companies with artillery by quickly refining the missions. This was done in the form of brief combat orders.

Upon reaching the crossing sector the artillery battalion (battery) would immediately deploy in battle formation. Fire positions were usually selected close to the place where subunits were loaded on to crossing vessels. This distance insured the time necessary to prepare the artillery battalion (battery) to open fire against the enemy and, consequently, insured suppression of part of the targets even before the crossing began.

Under cover of the fire of artillery, as well as the guns and tanks assigned to fire by direct laying, the subunits of the battalion would move out on self-propelled crossing vessels and begin forcing the river. If the crossing was being done at fords or surviving bridges, the infantry subunits would reach the crossing points during the fire strike by artillery and mortars operating in the particular sector. When the crossing began artillery would switch to waging intensive fire against machine guns, cannons, mortars, and manpower at the water's edge.

When the landing vessels reached the far shore artillery fire was switched to the depth and concentrated against the strong point of the enemy defense, which was the immediate objective of attack for the battalion subunits that had made the crossing.

Battalion guns and mortars and the forward observation post of the artillery battery (battalion) attached to the battalion, headed by the leader of the administrative platoon, crossed with the first subunits. This enabled companies who had landed on the far shore to beat back the enemy's first counterattacks.

In support of the crossing subunits, the artillery commander would control fire from his observation post, concentrating strikes against the key targets. These were pointed out by the infantry battalion commander, by the leader of the administrative platoon from the forward observation post, or observed by the artillery commander himself. It was necessary for the artillery commander to wipe out (suppress) enemy means of fire, above all antitank weapons, without waiting for orders from the infantry commander.

This new regulation requirement promoted the initiative of commanders of artillery subunits and helped support continuous cooperation between motorized infantry subunits and artillery.

The methods of organizing cooperation between motorized infantry subunits and artillery have continued to develop in the late 1960's and 1970's. During this time motorized infantry subunits received amphibious armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, which enabled them to cross any water obstacles quickly. Engineer subunits were supplied with new landing means: self-propelled ferries, amphibious personnel carriers, and improved pontoon equipment. These things enabled units to move all types of combat equipment, including missile launchers and heavy tanks, across water obstacles.⁹ All this made it possible to force water obstacles on a wider front, usually on the run and quickly. Without waiting for the approach and concentration

of all men and equipment, but taking advantage of the results of nuclear weapons and under cover of fire by artillery, tanks, and close support guns, motorized infantry subunits would cross the water obstacle in their own amphibious armored personnel carriers on the run, wiping out the enemy with all means of fire from the water.¹⁰ This was exactly how the motorized infantry battalion commanded by Lt Yu. Paseyshvili crossed a water obstacle during the Dnepr exercise held in September 1967.¹¹

The speed of the advance and crossing caused a curtailment of time available to organize cooperation. It should be noted that in all cases cooperation was organized simultaneously with formulation of combat missions in the interests of timely preparation for the crossing. Specifically, the commander of the battalion assigned as forward detachment (vanguard) adopted a plan, assigned missions to subunits, and organized the crossing during the approach to the water obstacle. Attached artillery were assigned to support subunits during the crossing and battle on the opposite bank and given the order of crossing. During the battle, as before, cooperation was maintained by giving new combat missions and constant communication between the infantry and artillery commanders.

The exercise conducted with the 1st Motorized Infantry Battalion, commanded by Capt I. Gusak, may serve as a typical example.¹² At 1230 the infantry battalion, with an artillery battalion, mortar battery, tank company, and hospital and amphibious personnel carrier platoons, received its mission: operating as vanguard, force Bystrya River on the run and secure the crossing of the main forces.

Artillery and crossing means were told the direction of movement, time, and rendezvous point. At 1420 the howitzer battalion was to conduct a 10-minute fire strike to neutralize the powerful enemy strongpoint on hill 90.0 and support the fighting of the advance party, and then of the main forces, on the far bank. The mortar battery was directed to wipe out the enemy in front of the battalion's right flank. It was to cross in the amphibious personnel carrier's first run to support the combat actions of the march security patrol. The artillery battalion was to cross on the last trips.

At 1425 the infantry commander gave the signal to start the fire strike. The advance party, followed by the second and third companies, crossed quickly to the opposite bank in armored personnel carriers with the support of artillery and tank fire and there attacked the enemy in their axes. The first motorized infantry company, which was the advance party, enveloped the strongpoint on hill 90.0 and attacked it from the flank, forcing the enemy to abandon the hill. Capt I. Gusak repulsed the counterattack by the forward company and ten tanks, which was delivered against the left flank of the battalion, with the fire of the entire artillery battalion and mortar battery. After this the artillery battalion began crossing to the north bank by batteries and taking up new fire positions.

In this way, close cooperation between a motorized infantry battalion and artillery assured successful, rapid crossing of a river.

During the Great Patriotic War artillery often did not cross to the beachhead captured by the infantry until several days after the crossing began; at the present time motorized infantry and artillery subunits cross the water obstacle almost simultaneously.

In general, during the period under consideration the conditions, specific features, scope, and order of organizing and maintaining cooperation between infantry (motorized infantry) subunits and artillery when forcing water obstacles developed significantly.

A completely new feature is coordination of artillery fire with nuclear strikes and the actions of tactical airborne parties.

In addition, the highly dynamic nature of combat has required a switch from sequential, methodical work, usually done on the terrain, to organize cooperation to the situation today where cooperation is organized quickly, on the run, often by maps, and controlled by a precise battle order (command) and brief instructions on cooperation. Nonetheless, personal communications between the commanders of motorized infantry and artillery subunits has remained imperative.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pavlovskiy, I. G., "Sukhoputnyye Voyska" [Ground Forces], Moscow, Znaniye, 1977, p 38.
2. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 February 1979.
3. "Boyevyye Deystviya Strelkovogo (Mekhanizirovannogo) Polka. Uchbenoye Posobiye" [Combat Actions of a Rifle (Mechanized) Regiment. Training Aid], Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Voennoy Akademii imeni M. V. Frunze, 1953, p 167.
4. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 September 1947.
5. VOYENNY VESTNIK 1961, No 5, pp 32-33.
6. Maysoyedov, P. G., "Forsirovaniye Rek Usilennymi Strelkovymi Podrazdeleniyami" [River Crossings by Reinforced Rifle Subunits], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1960, p 84.
- 9.* "Yadernyy Vek i Voyna" [The Nuclear Age and Warfare], Moscow, Izvestiya, 1964, p 196.

* [Footnotes 7 and 8 are missing from the Russian text.]

10. "Boyevoy Ustav Sukhoputnykh Voysk" [Field Manual of the Ground Forces].
11. "Dnepr" [The Dnepr Exercises], Voenizdat, 1968, p 68.
12. VOYENNY VESTNIK 1976, No 10, pp 37-38.

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WARTIME TANK CORPS OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 27-33

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Maj Gen Tank Trps I. Skorodumov: "The 2nd Guards Tank Corps in the Belorussian Operation"]

[Text] Despite the complex conditions of forested and swampy terrain, one of the most important factors that enabled our forces to advance at a high rate in the Belorussian Operation (20-30 kilometers a day for rifle troops and more than 40 kilometers a day for mobile troops) was the broad, massed use of tank and mechanized formations for swift development of the attack of army and front forces.

The 2nd Guards Tatsinskiy Tank Corps commanded by Maj Gen Tank Troops A. S. Burdeynyy took an active part in the operation.¹ Col A. K. Kropotin was chief of the corps political branch until he was wounded in late June and replaced by Col I. A. Chernyshev; chief of staff of the corps was Col A. F. Karavan.

The corps was assigned an important part in this operation. As an echelon for developing the success of the 11th Guards Army commanded by Lt Gen K. N. Galitskiy, which was conducting its operation in the axis of the main strike by forces of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the corps was supposed to bolster the force of the strike by rifle formations of the army first echelon on the first day of the operation, complete the break through the prepared enemy defense with them, and thus create favorable conditions for introducing the 5th Guards Tank Army into the battle.

By the start of the operation the corps included the 4th, 25th, and 26th Guards tank and 4th Guards Motorized Rifle brigades, the 401st and 1,500th self-propelled artillery regiments, the 273rd Mortar Regiment, the 1,695th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, the 28th Detached Guards Mortar Battalion, the 79th Detached Motorcycle Battalion, the 51st Sapper Battalion, the 1st Detached Guards Signal Battalion, and repair and rear units and subunits. In all the corps had 11,132 men, 252 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 112 field guns and mortars.²

The high fighting capabilities of the corps enabled it to perform complex combat missions both in cooperation with rifle formations and operating independently at operational depths. In conformity with the intention of the army operation the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was introduced into the battle after the break through the main enemy line of defense in order to take the Nazi rear position on the Orshitsa River. Then, developing the attack along the Minsk Highway, its formations were to strike at the enemy in a southerly direction and take Starosel'ye by the start of the fourth day of the operation, cutting off the enemy Orsha grouping's path of retreat to the west. After performance of this mission the corps was to develop the offensive to the southwest, forcing the Berezina near Chernyavka and taking a beachhead on its west bank by the end of the 6th day of the operation.³

The corps was supposed to perform these difficult combat missions in the enemy's operational depth cut off from the first-echelon rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, waging the attack at a high speed under the difficult conditions of forested and swampy terrain, crossing water obstacles and seizing beachheads on them. The success not just of the actions of the 11th Guards Army, but of the entire operation depended largely on performance of these missions.

The corps entered the battle in the second half of the first day of the attack on the decision of the army commander. The corps moved out from the Zabezhnitsa-Shalashino line (see figure) after the break through the main enemy zone of defense. Its objective was to complete the breakthrough of the entire tactical zone of defense. In the next three days the corps was to attack along the Moscow-Minsk Highway, in cooperation with aviation, smash enemy operational reserves, and take Tolochin, an important center of resistance. As a variation the plan required the corps to be ready to maneuver in a northern (to Obol'tsy and Senno) or southern (to Starosel'ye) direction in order to cut off the Nazis' path of retreat to the west. It was planned to support the corps' introduction into the break with the fire of a brigade of army cannon artillery and actions by a Guards Motor Regiment and formations of the 1st Air Army.

The corps battle formation envisioned two echelons. The 4th and 26th Guards Tank Brigades constituted the first; the 4th Guards Motorized Rifle and 25th Guards Tank Brigades made up the second.

In conversation with the author of these lines, Col Gen A. S. Burdeynyy related that Col Gen I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, commander of troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, was afraid, first of all, for his left flank, and therefore he considered that the 2nd Guards Tank Corps would cut off the German counterattack, if it came from the left, by moving from the Mogilev axis. In the second place, he thought that moving a formation to the Starosel'ye region and taking the strong center there would prevent German fascist forces from offering major resistance on advantageous natural lines and make an organized enemy retreat to the west more difficult.




Figure. Combat Actions of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps in June 1944

Key: (1) To Lepel'; (5) At the Start of 22 June 1944;
 (2) To Vitebsk; (6) At the Start of 25 June;
 (3) To Smolensk; (7) At 1500 of 26 June;
 (4) To Mogilev; (8) At 2100 of 26 June;
 (4a) To Krichev; (9) By the Morning of 27 June.

(a) Senno;	(g) Krasnoye;	(m) Tolochin;
(b) Gorbovo;	(h) Tusino;	(n) Starosel'ye;
(c) Klyukovka;	(i) Obol'tsy;	(o) Dnepr River;
(d) Osinstroy;	(j) Pogost;	(p) Chernaya Orshitsa
(e) Zabezhinetsa;	(k) Orsha;	River.
(f) Shalashino;	(l) Kokhanovo;	

[Throughout the figure units are designated by their number followed by these Russian abbreviations]

A	- Army;
YP	- Fortified Region;
nd	- Infantry Division;
md	- Mechanized Division;
18.cd	- Guards Rifle Division;
18.m6p	- Guards Tank Brigade;
18.m6p	- Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade.

After receiving battle missions the formations and units of the corps began preparations for the attack. Because the corps was to attack through forested and swampy terrain and cross water obstacles, the units and subunits devoted special attention to practical work on all matters related to waging battle in these conditions. Commanders and staff carefully studied maps of the regions of forthcoming action. Commander's reconnaissance of the routes of travel of the tank units, fire positions of artillery and mortars, and locations of command and observation posts was carried out on the terrain. On 10 and 11 June the corps commander conducted commander's reconnaissance with the brigade and regiment commanders and on 12 and 13 June the brigade and regimental commanders did the same with battalion and company commanders.

All the brigades and the corps motorcycle battalions set up special posts for observation and reconnaissance in the zones of the rifle divisions of the army first echelon in the sector where the corps would be fed into the breakthrough. These reconnaissance elements, moving ahead of the forward subunits of the rifle divisions, were to provide information on the position and actions of the enemy and friendly forces.

During preparation for the attack a great deal of party political work was done in the units and formations of the corps. The challenges of communists and Komsomol members in the upcoming battle were discussed at party and Komsomol meetings. Making use of the cases of savagery, torture, and mockery by the fascists against local inhabitants, activists told the soldiers, sergeants, and officers about the conditions under which the Belorussian people were living and fighting and how impatiently they were awaiting liberation.

As a result of party political work, during the period of preparation for the fighting 712 of the best soldiers and commanders joined the ranks of the party and 450 became Komsomol members.

Special attention was given to the young soldiers arriving in units of the corps as replacements shortly before the fighting began. A ceremony was held when the corps received the Sibiryak tank column, which was formed at the expense of the working people of Irkutskaya Oblast. The powerful combat vehicles and weapons were turned over to newcomers in front of a unit formation with the Guards Banner flying. The transfer of tanks whose crews had died heroically in earlier fighting was especially significant. Specifically, the young fighting men were given the tanks formerly driven by deceased Heroes of the Soviet Union: Yu. N. Malakhov, M. Ye. Nechayev, M. V. Oktyabr'skaya, and N. S. Polezhayev.⁴ The tank troops vowed to perform their duty to the Motherland with honor. In the days that followed they kept this promise.

During the preparatory period important activities were carried out to organize control, cooperation with rifle troops and aviation, and for combat and logistic support.

The 11th Guards Army began combat actions on the morning of 23 June 1944 after strong artillery and aviation preparations. But immediately

events did not develop exactly as planned by the army and front command. The enemy resisted most strongly on the army's left flank, where the formations of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were supposed to be introduced.

Taking advantage of the rugged terrain and nearly impassable swamps, the enemy created a deeply echeloned defense in the Orsha axis, attempting to hold the Moscow-Minsk Highway at all costs. Therefore, the corps was not introduced into fighting on the first or the second day of the operation. Basing his thinking on experience in previous fighting, Gen A. S. Burdeynyy realized the full danger of premature introduction of the tank corps at a time when the first defensive zone was not yet broken through. With detailed information obtained from his reconnaissance men operating in the battle formations of the rifle units that had attacked, the corps commander reported to Gen K. N. Galitskiy that the German defense had not been broken through, and he was able to convince the army commander that it would be extremely disadvantageous to introduce the corps under these circumstances. The commander understood his arguments.

At 2000 of 24 June Gen A. S. Burdeynyy received information that units of the right flank rifle formations of the army had liberated Osinstroy and were successfully moving west. On the same day formation headquarters received a report from one of the reconnaissance patrols concerning the possibility of our tanks' getting through near this populated point. The corps commander immediately reported this to the army commander and set off for Osinstroy with an operational group. The 51st Sapper Battalion of the formation was also sent there. After determining on the spot that if the embankment of an old narrow gauge railway were reinforced in a few places and brushwood were laid in swampy sectors it would be possible to bring the units of the corps into action in this axis, A. S. Burdeynyy reported this to General Galitskiy at the army command post. The army commander agreed with the corps commander's reasoning and gave the order to commit the corps to action.

Thus, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was brought into action under special conditions where it had been regrouped ahead of time in the axis of the planned success by rifle formations and it was committed to the battle there when the tactical zone of enemy defense was already broken through to its full depth. In short, the formation was put into what was called a "clean break" and began developing the attack in its assigned axis. And although there was a certain risk associated with actions in forested and swampy terrain, the corps commander took it because he was convinced that the commanders and all personnel of the units and formations of the corps could carry out their assigned mission. And there was much to be gained: the commitment of 250 tanks and self-propelled guns and hundreds of field guns and mortars attacking the enemy flank and rear at an unexpected place.

As became known later, the enemy had no idea at all that an entire tank corps could get through north of the Minsk Highway, through the woods and swamps. But the Guards tank troops, showing resourcefulness,

enormous strength of will, and courage, were able to surmount all obstacles in their way and, by a swift march, reach the regions southwest of Klyukovka by the start of 25 June, completely surprising the enemy.

The corps' strike from the north played an important role in crushing the Nazi troops in the Orsha axis. Brigades of the corps, mauling the enemy in populated points and on intermediate lines, began offensive actions toward Kokhanovo during the day of 26 June. The 25th Guards Tank Brigade was brought into action and took the railroad station at Pogost, 15 kilometers west of Orsha.

At this same time units of the 16th Guards Rifle Division reached the approaches to Orsha from the north, but there the enemy bolstered his resistance and the division slowed down its advance. The situation demanded that Orsha be taken as quickly as possible.

Army commander Gen K. N. Galitskiy arrived in Pogost at the command post of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps in the afternoon and ordered part of the forces of the corps to strike Orsha from the west while the remaining formations developed the attack in the Starosel'ye axis. Gen A. S. Burdeynyy allocated the 25th Guards Tank Brigade commanded by Lt Col S. M. Bulygin to perform this mission. The city was liberated on 27 June by a combined night attack by rifle units of the 11th Guards and 31st armies and the tank brigade. This was very important. As pointed out in the Supreme Commander's Order of 26 June 1944, Orsha was an operationally important rail center which the Nazis had turned into a bastion of their defense, covering the Minsk axis. The order also noted that formations of the 3rd Belorussian Front commanded by Generals P. G. Shafranov, A. S. Burdeynyy, and G. B. Peters had particularly distinguished themselves in liberation of the city.

Fighting men of the corps showed exceptionally great courage and bravery during this fighting. Four tank soldiers, Guards Lt A. P. Volkov, Guards Jr Lts N. M. Ol'shevskiy and A. B. Mikhaylov, and Guards Sr Sgt. V. A. Goloskov became Heroes of the Soviet Union.⁶

Our aviation gave the 2nd Guards Tank Corps considerable support. On 26 June alone pilots of the 1st Air Army performed 620 missions.

By 2100 of 26 June units of the 4th Guards Tank Brigade commanded by Col O. A. Losik had liberated Kokhanovo and on the morning of 27 June, together with units of the 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade commanded by Lt M. S. Antipin, they liberated Starosel'ye.

The final rout of the enemy's Orsha grouping enabled our forces to step up the pace of the attack. Uninterrupted pursuit of the German fascist troops began.

By the start of 29 June forward units of the corps had reached the Berezina. They had to cross it in the Chernyavka region and then

advance in the Zabashevichi, Glivino, Zhodino axis, continuing on to Minsk.⁷ The river is not wide at Chernyavka, only 100-110 meters, but the swampy floodplain which stretched for 600-800 meters made it difficult for the tanks to approach the river and cross it without crossing vessels. Subunits of the 4th and 25th Guards Tank brigades and sappers of the 51st Sapper Battalion commanded by Maj A. N. Mel'nikov were the first to reach the water barrier. The Nazis were unable to completely destroy the bridge, but they managed to set it on fire. Subunits of Capt B. V. Ovchinnikov's sapper company showed courage and bravery in putting out the fire. The squads of sappers commanded by Sr Sgt Ye. V. Anisimov and Sgt Ye. A. Bidkov particularly distinguished themselves. Under enemy fire they put out the flames and prevented the fire from spreading.

The surviving piles and spans of the bridge and trees and brush from the forest along the bank were used, at the corps commander's order, to restore the burned part of the bridge and lay a road across the floodplain on the right bank. The sappers were able to rig up a steep ramp from the remaining part of the bridge to the floodplain quickly and reliably. The situation improved when the pontoon battalion reached the river and set up a floating bridge.

While the crossing was underway the corps commander and a group of staff officers with guards went out to meet the commander of one of the partisan detachments operating in the forests west of Chernyavka. It was necessary to get more reliable information on the German fascist troops located west of the Berezina and on the condition of forest and unpaved roads. The partisans reported where the enemy garrisons were and showed them which roads and forest openings could be traveled without fear of enemy roadblocks and mines.

During the night before 2 July the Tatsinskiy Tank Corps raced westward, toward Minsk. After completing a dash of almost 60 kilometers, in the afternoon the corps liberated Snolevichi. Furious fighting broke out on the line Korolev Stan, Zhukov Lug, Bitaya Gora. The enemy was able to set fire to several of our tanks there. As Col Gen A. S. Burdeynyy remarked, the commanders and staffs were at fault for this. They had not organized reconnaissance properly, were careless, and paid for this with losses. On the approaches to Minsk they had to give special attention to sending out additional reconnaissance groups and patrols. It was apparent that the colossal strain was showing. The tank soldiers had been fighting day and night for eight days, beginning on 25 June, and were greatly fatigued.

After this reconnaissance troops operated more skillfully and decisively. They were the first to reach Minsk, penetrated the city unobserved, and communicated valuable information to the corps commander. The remains of the enemy's 78th, 250th, and 260th infantry divisions and his 5th Tank Division were mopped up or driven back on the approaches to the capital of Belorussia.

During the night before 3 July Gen A. S. Burdeynyy, after receiving reports from brigade and regimental commanders, reached a decision to assault Minsk at first light. This time too he decided to employ surprise so that the enemy would not be able to organize a defense with forces that retreated from the east and reserves advancing from the west. The reconnaissance information that large columns of vehicles carrying soldiers were stopped along the streets of Minsk was considered. These enemy forces were probably going to go on the defense from the eastern margin of the city on the morning of 3 July.

The 26th Guards Tank Brigade (commanded by Col S. K. Nesterov) and the 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade received their battle missions personally, while missions were given to the second echelon by radio. The essential point of the corps commander's instructions was to load the tank and self-propelled guns with ammunition, fuel them up, feed the men, and send out reconnaissance patrols during the night. The advance toward Minsk was to begin at 0200 of 3 July in order to go over to the attack at 0500. The order stated that the 25th Guards Tank Brigade would attack the city along the Logoyisk Highway; the 4th Guards Tank Brigade would attack along the Moscow-Minsk Highway on Sovetskaya Ulitsa (today Leninskiy Prospekt), while the 26th Guards Tank Brigade would attack in the axis of Chelyuskintsev Park.

It is noteworthy that the corps commander envisioned steps to support his right flank. The 401st Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment was ordered to seize and hold the roads heading toward Minsk from the north, from Molodechno, Rakov, and other directions.

At 0400 of 3 July combat reconnaissance patrols raced into the city and the attack began at 0500. By this time the corps commanders and Lt Gen Tank Trps G. S. Rodin, front commander of armored and mechanized forces, were at the command post at the Minsk observatory.

The soldiers of the 4th Guards Tank Brigade, not encountering armed resistance, were the first to enter the city at 0500. They came from the northeast and raced toward the center. After 30 minutes other brigades also entered Minsk. Forward detachments of the 11th Guards Army and 31st Army reached the northern edge of the capital of Belorussia.

The tank of Jr Lt D. G. Frolikov of the 4th Guards Tank Brigade was one of the first to reach the center of the city. The crew of this tank wiped out a Ferdinand gun, two antiaircraft guns, and an antitank gun. For this courageous feat the officer was given the Gold Star of a Hero of the Soviet Union. The T-34 tank mounted on a pedestal in front of the District Officers Club is a permanent monument to the courage of the soldiers and commanders of the 4th Guards Minsk Red Banner Tank Brigade.

On the approaches to Minsk and during fighting in the city, fighting men of the 4th Guards Tank Brigade alone wiped out 15 tanks, four

assault guns, 52 field guns and mortars, 13 radio stations, and about 3,000 enemy soldiers and officers. They captured 22 guns, 200 motor vehicles, 38 supply depots, and 1,800 Nazi soldiers.⁸

Tank platoon leader Lt N. I. Kolychev, one of the veterans of the corps, distinguished himself during capture of the bridge over the Svisloch' near the Opera Theater. The tank troops seized and cleared mines from the bridge over which the tank battalion commanded by Capt P. F. Klochko raced toward Liberty Square. N. I. Kolychev was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for his bold and enterprising actions and was later made an honorary citizen of Minsk.

The tank troops of Capt A. A. Yakovlev's company from the 26th Guards Tank Brigade distinguished themselves in the fighting for the freight station. Their tanks fired and attacked so unexpectedly that the Nazis could not withstand the onslaught and turned and ran.

By 1300 the main forces of brigades had reached the western edge of the city. At this time the forward subunits and units of the 1st Guard Tank Corps of Gen M. S. Panov broke into Minsk from the south. They were followed from the southeast by formations of the 3rd Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

The Motherland was deeply grateful for the heroism of its sons. Many soldiers and officers of the corps received high government awards. Seventeen courageous fighting men were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union and six units were given the name "Minsk." The corps and all of its four brigades received the Order of the Red Banner.

Corps commander Gen A. S. Burdeynyy was awarded the Order of Lenin. A few months later he was given the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union and promoted to lieutenant general of tank troops.

Analysis of the activities carried out by the corps commander and staff during preparation for the offensive and during combat actions by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps in the Belorussian operation allows us to draw the following important conclusions.

The commitment of the tank corps to battle in a new axis not envisioned by the plan of the operation confirms the need to assign several directions for bringing it into action, one of which should be primary. In each axis several start lines must be designated.

Experience with control of units and formations of the corps by its commander and staff deserve special attention, in our opinion. It is important that the corps commander and a group of officers purposely went ahead, carried out commander's reconnaissance of the terrain in the most important axes of brigade actions, adopted the plan on the spot, and gave appropriate battle commands and instructions. This method of troop control worked out completely. The rapid maneuver with corps men and equipment to a new direction in order to reach the enemy flank and

rear and conducting pursuit of the enemy at a high rate across difficult forested and swampy terrain are instructive features of the operation.

The combat actions of units and formations of the corps at night deserve attention.

Overall we must say that thorough, comprehensive study of the combat experience of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps in the Belorussian Operation and use of this experience are important conditions for raising the level of tactical training in tank units and formations.

FOOTNOTES

1. A. S. Burdeynyy is now a retired colonel-general, Hero of the Soviet Union, and honorary citizen of the city of Minsk.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fund 661, inventory 81133, file 2, sheet 28.
3. Ibid.
4. "Osvobozhdeniye Belorussii" [The Liberation of Belorussia], 2nd ed, revised and supplemented, Moscow, Nauka, 1974, p 612.
5. Galitskiy, K. N., "Gody Surovykh Ispytaniy 1941-1944. Zapiski Komandarma" [1941-1944: Years of Harsh Trials. An Army Commander's Notes], Moscow, Nauka, 1973, p 520.
6. "Krasnoznamennyy Belorusskiy Voennoy Otkrug" [The Red Banner Belorussian Military District], Minsk, Belarus', 1973, p 333.
7. TsAMO, fund 241, inventory 2658, file 25, sheet, 244.
8. Ibid., fund 241, inventory 2658, file 25, sheet, 247.

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BREZHNEV PARTICIPATION IN WW II VICTORY PARADE RECOUNTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 34-42

[Unattributed article published under the heading "The Victory Parade":
"The 4th Ukrainian Front"]

[Text] The composite regiment of the 4th Ukrainian Front passed the reviewing stand on the Lenin Mausoleum. This was the front that had formerly been known as the Southeastern, Stalingrad, and Southern, the front whose glorious forces had fought their way from Stalingrad to Prague. To commemorate the victories won, Moscow, the capital of our Motherland, saluted its valiant fighting men 25 times.

Army Gen. Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko (made Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955), front commander, headed the column of the front's composite regiment. The commissar of this regiment was Maj Gen Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, who is today General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the Defense Council, and a marshal of the Soviet Union.

"I will never forget the great act of triumph, the victory parade on Red Square," L. I. Brezhnev wrote in his book "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land]. "It was with joy and pride that I read the order saying that General Brezhnev, chief of the front political directorate, was appointed commissar of the composite regiments of the 4th Ukrainian Front. To this day I keep as a precious souvenir the saber that I carried as I marched with the command at the head of our composite regiment."*

L. I. Brezhnev, outstanding figure of the Communist Party and Soviet Government and of the international communist and worker movement,

* Brezhnev, Leonid Il'ich, "Malaya Zemlya," Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 48.

was born on 19 December 1906 in the town of Kamenskoye, today named Dneprodzerzhinsk. After graduation from the Kursk Land Use Planning and Reclamation Tekhnikum in 1927 he worked as a land use planner in Kokhanovskiy Rayon of the Orshanskiy District of the Belorussian SSR, in Kurskaya Guberniya, and in the Urals, where he was head of a rayon agricultural department and deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Bisertskiy Rayon Soviet, as well as first deputy chief of the Ural'skaya Oblast Agricultural Administration. He joined the Komsomol in 1923 and became a member of the CPSU in 1931. After graduation from the metallurgical institute in Dneprodzerzhinsk in 1935 he became an engineer at the metallurgical plant in the same city. He went on active military duty in 1935-1936 as political instructor of a tank company in the Transbaikal Military District, and then returned to the plant where he worked as an engineer. He later served as director of a tekhnikum, deputy chairman of the executive committee of the Dneprodzerzhinsk City Soviet, head of a department, and, from February 1939, secretary of the Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Bolshevik).

L. I. Brezhnev did important political work in the active army from the first days of the Great Patriotic War until its end. He occupied the positions of deputy chief of the political directorate of the Southern Front, chief of the political branch of the 18th Army, and chief of the political directorate of the 4th Ukrainian Front. He fought the enemy courageously in the combat ranks of Soviet fighting men, defending his native land. He took an active part in preparation for and conduct of a series of major operations, in the fighting for Rostov-na-Donu, Tuapse, and Kerch', and in the liberation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. He directed the activities of political agencies who performed an enormous amount of organizational and political work in the formations, units, and subunits to mobilize personnel to accomplish combat missions.

Serving as chief of the political directorate of the Carpathian Military District after the Great Patriotic War, L. I. Brezhnev did a great deal to summarize and implement the war experience in practical troop combat and political training. In August 1946 he became first secretary of the Zaporozhskaya Oblast party committee and in November 1947 became first secretary of the Dnepropetrovskaya Oblast party committee. In 1950-1952 he was first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, and in 1952-1953 served as a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

L. I. Brezhnev worked as deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy in 1953-1954, directing the efforts of political agencies to improve the ideological conditioning of fighting men and see that army and navy personnel incorporated new military equipment and weapons quickly. In early 1954 he was sent to the Kazakh SSR for party management work. He was elected second (February 1954) and later first (August 1955) secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan there.

In 1956-1960 L. I. Brezhnev was a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, serving concurrently as deputy chairman of the RSFSR Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee after 1958. From May 1960 to July 1964 he was Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, serving concurrently as a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee from June 1963 until October 1964. From October 1964 until April 1966 he was First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the RSFSR Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. From April 1966 until the present day he has been General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. In June 1977 he was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and on 18 April 1979 at the first session of the 10th convocation of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev was reelected to this high government position. In 1952-1953 and 1956-1957 he was a nonvoting member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, then became a full member from June 1957 to April 1966. He was a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet, third-10th convocations, and a member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1965-1977.

In the position of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev's abilities as an outstanding political figure of the Lenin type have shown brilliantly. L. I. Brezhnev has participated directly in the work of the CPSU Central Committee to work out and implement important steps to develop Leninist norms of party and state building, establish collective principles in work, achieve continued economic growth and improvement in the well-being and cultural level of the working people, and strengthen friendships among the peoples of the USSR. L. I. Brezhnev has enriched the theory and practice of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet state with new propositions that are decisive for the struggle to bolster international security and achieve social progress.

For his outstanding contributions to the struggle to preserve and strengthen peace L. I. Brezhnev was awarded the international Lenin Prize "For Strengthening International Peace" in 1973, the highest award of the World Peace Council (the F. Joliot-Curie Gold Medal of Peace) in 1975, and the international Dimitrov Peace Prize in 1978. In 1979 he was awarded the Lenin Prize for his books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [Resurrection], and "Tselina" [Virgin Land] and for his tireless struggle for peace.

As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Chairman of the Defense Council L. I. Brezhnev devotes constant attention to strengthening the defensive might of our country. The issues of military development and building the strength and fighting effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces are decided under his direct leadership. The life and activity of the Soviet Armed Forces and the training, education, and political indoctrination of their personnel are a subject of constant attention for the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo which are headed by L. I. Brezhnev. L. I. Brezhnev meets regularly with fighting men, speaks to the graduates of military academies, and

attends the most important army and navy exercises and maneuvers. He devotes great attention to increasing the defensive capability of the socialist community by every means.

L. I. Brezhnev has been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union three times for his outstanding contribution to the Communist Party and Soviet State in communist building, strengthening the country's defense capability, and great contributions to the struggle against the German fascist aggressors at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. He is a Hero of Socialist Labor and has received the highest military award, the Order of Victory, seven Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Degree, the Order of the Red Star, a Weapon of Honor, and various medals of the USSR. He has been named a Hero of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic (twice), a Hero of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (twice), a Hero of the German Democratic Republic, and a Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic, as well as receiving high orders from many other countries.

The commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front was
Army Gen Andrey Ivanovich Yeremenko, who became
Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955.

Mar SU A. I. Yeremenko died in 1970.

Following the front commander came a rank of army commanders.

The commander of the 1st Guards Army was Col Gen
Andrey Antonovich Grechko, who became marshal of
the Soviet Union in 1955.

Mar SU A. A. Grechko died in 1976.

The commander of the 8th Air Army was Lt Gen Avn
Vasiliy Nikolayevich Zhdanov, who became colonel-
general of aviation in 1946.

Col Gen V. N. Zhdanov died in 1956.

The commander of the 38th Army was Col Gen Kirill
Semenovich Moskalenko, who today is a Marshal of
the Soviet Union.

K. S. Moskalenko was born in the town of Grishino of the present-day Donetskaya Oblast in 1902. He became a member of the CPSU in 1926. He entered the Soviet Army in 1920 and took part in the Civil War. As a private he fought against White Guard and counterrevolutionary bands in the Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Don and North Caucasus region. After the war he served as a platoon leader, commander of an artillery battery and battalion, chief of staff and commander of an artillery

regiment, chief of artillery of a mechanized brigade and rifle division (with which he took part in the Soviet-Finnish conflict), and chief of artillery in a rifle corps and a mechanized corps. In May 1941 he became commander of the 1st Motorized Antitank Artillery Brigade. This was the position he held when the Great Patriotic War broke out.

In August 1941 K. S. Moskalenko took command of the 15th Rifle Corps, then of the 6th Cavalry Corps and a group of mechanized cavalry forces. In late 1941 he became deputy commander of the 6th Army. Beginning in March 1942 he commanded, in turn, the 38th, 1st Tank, 1st Guards, and 40th armies. In October 1943 he again took command of the 38th Army and remained in that position until war's end.

During the war the troops under K. S. Moskalenko's leadership fought well in battles at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, on the Dnepr, and in the liberation of the Right Bank Ukraine and Czechoslovakia. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 366 fighting men of the 38th Army.

After the war K. S. Moskalenko commanded an army and the forces of the Moscow Air Defense District and the Moscow Military District. He served as commander of the Strategic Missile Forces and deputy USSR minister of defense. Since 1962 he has held the positions of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense and deputy USSR minister of defense.

For personal courage and bravery, skillful leadership of troops, and other contributions to the Homeland and Armed Forces K. S. Moskalenko has been awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union twice and received six Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, five Orders of the Red Banner, two Orders of Suvorov 1st Degree, two Orders of Kutuzov 1st Degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy 1st Degree, the Order for Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces 3rd Degree, and numerous medals.

The commander of the 60th army was Col Gen Pavel Alekseyevich Kurochkin, who today is an army general.

P. A. Kurochkin was born in 1900 in the village of Cornevo of the present-day Vyazemskiy Rayon, Smolenskaya Oblast. He became a member of the CPSU in 1920. He joined the Soviet Army in 1918. During the Great October Socialist Revolution he was a member of the Red Guards who stormed the Winter Palace. During the Civil War he served as a private, platoon leader, and commander of a squadron and cavalry regiment fighting against the White Guards and White Poles. He participated in putting down the Antonov SR-kula uprising in Tambovskaya Guberniya. After the war P. A. Kurochkin was commander of a squadron at a division NCO school, head of a regimental school, chief of staff of a cavalry regiment, teacher at the Academy imeni M. V. Frunze, and chief of staff and commander of a cavalry brigade and cavalry division. In 1939 he

was chief of staff of the 2nd Cavalry Corps. He took part in the liberation march into the Western Ukraine as chief of staff of an army cavalry group. He commanded the 28th Rifle Corps during the Soviet-Finnish conflict.

In 1940-1941 he commanded the 1st Army Group of Forces, an army, the troops of the Transbaikal and Orel military districts, and the 20th and 43rd armies. In the war years that followed he was the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in the Northwestern Front, commander and deputy commander of the same front, and commander of the 11th and 34th armies. In June 1943 he again became commander of the Northwestern Front. In December 1943 P. A. Kurochkin was made deputy commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, then in February 1944 commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front. From April 1944 until the end of the war he commanded the 60th Army. The title Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 354 fighting men of the 60th Army.

After the war P. A. Kurochkin commanded the troops of the Kuban' Military District and occupied a number of important positions in the directorates of the military districts and the unified command of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. He also served as chief of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. Since 1970 he has been a military inspector and advisor to the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

For skillful leadership of troops, courage, bravery, and contributions to the Armed Forces he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, four orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov 1st Degree, two orders of Kutuzov 1st Degree, the Order for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces 3rd Degree, the Badge of Honor Order, and numerous medals.

The commander of the 18th Army was Lt Gen Anton Iosifovich Gastilovich, who became a colonel general in 1959.

Col Gen A. I. Iosifovich Gastilovich died in 1975.

Following the rank of army commanders came the composite regiment of the 4th Ukrainian Front, led by the commander of the composite regiment, Lt Gen Andrey Leont'yevich Bondarev, commander of the 101st Guards Rifle Corps.

Lt Gen A. L. Bondarev died in 1961.

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DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL ON THE BELORUSSIAN OPERATION

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 49-52

[Article, prepared for publication by Lt Col A. Izosimov, incorporating documentary material on operational camouflage, concealment and deception: "On the 35th Anniversary of the Belorussian Operation"]

[Text] The Belorussian Operation of 23 June-29 August 1944 was one of the largest strategic offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front and 3rd, 2nd, and 1st Belorussian fronts, long-range aviation, the Dnepr Naval Flotilla, and the large partisan army were enlisted to conduct it.

In the course of the Belorussian Operation one of the strongest enemy groupings, Army Group Center, was smashed. Seventeen of its divisions and three brigades were completely wiped out and 50 divisions lost more than half of their personnel. In addition, about 2,000 enemy aircraft were destroyed.¹

As a result of the Belorussian Operation the Belorussian SSR, parts of the Lithuanian and Latvian SSR's, and the eastern regions of Poland were liberated. Favorable conditions were created for delivering strong blows against the enemy in the Baltic, East Prussia, and Poland.

The Belorussian Operation had many distinctive traits and characteristics. Here are some of them.

The operation was enormous in scope. The attack developed in a zone of 700 kilometers and ended on a front of more than 1,000 kilometers. By late August our troops had advanced 550-600 kilometers by fighting. The four Soviet fronts had 2.4 million men, 36,400 field guns and mortars, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 5,300 aircraft (not counting long-range aviation).² At the start of the operation the

¹ "Sovetskaya Voennoye Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1976, p 433.

² "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 9, Voenizdat, 1979, p 47.

enemy grouping had 1.2 million men, about 9,500 guns and mortars of various calibers, more than 900 tanks and assault guns, and 1,350 aircraft.

The Belorussian Operation achieved surprise. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command was able to do this by misleading the German fascist command, which was certain that the main strike in the summer and fall campaign of 1944 would come not in Belorussia, but on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. This is shown, for example, by the fact that 24 of the 30 tank and motorized divisions that the Nazis had on the entire Soviet-German front were concentrated south of the Pripyat'.

The operation was also characterized by simultaneous breaks through the enemy defense in six sectors quite far from one another. This insured that the enemy grouping would be broken up into parts and created favorable conditions for encirclement and mopping them up one by one. The simultaneous breaks in the enemy defense in several axes prevented the enemy from organizing strong countermeasures to stop the attack.

The Belorussian Operation was the first time in the Great Patriotic War that the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command planned and brilliantly executed the encirclement and annihilation of an enemy grouping of 105,000 men at a distance of 200 kilometers from the forward edge (in the Minsk region). It was the first time Headquarters had successfully achieved cooperation between Soviet forces and strong Belorussian partisan forces on a large scale, which made the strikes against the enemy even stronger.

The most decisive form of combat action, the encirclement operation, was used more extensively than in previous operations. During the Belorussian Operation encirclements were carried out at Vitebsk, Bobruysk, Minsk, Vil'nyus, and Brest. Another new feature was that encircling, splitting up, and wiping out the enemy took place as a single, rapid process; at Stalingrad it took 2.5 months. At Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy it took 18 days. But at Minsk it took just 7-8 days.

The practice of artillery support for an attack by infantry and tanks using the method of the double fire barrage at a depth of 1.5-2.5 kilometers was used for the first time by the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts during the Belorussian Operation.

The use of mobile groups by the fronts was instructive. In most cases they were introduced into breakthroughs under favorable conditions. For example, the mechanized cavalry group of the 3rd Belorussian Front was fed into the breakthrough on the second day of the operation after the tactical zone of enemy defense had been broken through to a depth of 14-50 kilometers and the 5th Guards Tank Army was committed on the third day at a depth of 20-30 kilometers. All this facilitated the swift advance and rapid encirclement of a large enemy grouping near Minsk.

The use of aviation on the 1st Belorussian Front was unprecedented. It was actually the decisive factor in eliminating the enemy grouping surrounded in the Bobruysk region. Front commander Army Gen K. K. Rokossovskiy put 526 planes in the air to carry out a massive strike against the enemy, dropping 159 tons of bombs and firing 38,000 shells.

Unlike all preceding operations, reconnaissance in force was used very broadly in the Belorussian Operation. Forty-five reconnaissance subdivisions operated almost simultaneously in the attack zones of 11 armies on a front of about 500 kilometers. This confused the enemy as to the axis of the main strikes by our fronts and promoted a successful break through the tactical zone of defense. The swift break through the enemy defense was one of the distinctive features of the operation. In many sectors the tactical zone of defense was broken through on the first day of fighting. Carefully prepared and conducted reconnaissance in force, a strong initial strike, precise control and cooperation, and aggressive actions by subunit commanders fostered this.

Swift pursuit of the enemy was also a characteristic of the operation. It was done in combined fashion, by both frontal and parallel pursuit, with forward detachments ranging from rifle regiments and divisions to combined arms armies riding in motor vehicles and tanks.

The success was also promoted by steps taken on all fronts to achieve operational concealment.

The abridged documents given below concerned with operational concealment have not been published before.

From a Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command

"To Front Commanders:

"To insure concealment of activities going forward on all fronts, I order:

"1. All movements of troops and equipment are to be done only at night, strictly observing night march discipline. Movement during the day is to be authorized only in weather when flying is absolutely impossible, and only for individual groups that cannot be observed by the enemy on the ground. At daytime halting places and new assembly regions troops and equipment are to be dispersed and carefully camouflaged. Personnel must not communicate with the local population and movement of groups and subunits along open roads and terrain sectors must be minimized.

"Direct special attention to concealment when replacing first-line troops.

"2. During the entire period of regrouping and preparation for action keep up the existing fire situation. Establish a procedure for ranging artillery and mortar weapons that guarantees concealment of the artillery grouping in the primary axis.

"3. Prohibit newly arrived formations from conducting ground reconnaissance.

"4. Do not conduct commander's reconnaissance in large groups simultaneously. To conceal the true sectors of action organize the work of commander's reconnaissance groups on a broad front, including the passive sectors.

"In necessary cases, command personnel on commander's reconnaissance are authorized to wear the uniforms and gear of privates. Tank soldiers are categorically forbidden to appear on commander's reconnaissance in their special uniforms...

"13. Organize careful daily checks on execution of all orders relating to concealment. Make daily checks from the air of the concealment of headquarters and troop positions, for which purpose special officers from the front and army staffs must be appointed...

"Report on orders issued by 1 June 1944."

Zhukov
Antonov

1900, 29 May 1944

(TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fund 48-80, inventory 1795, file 3, sheets 3-5. Original.)

From the 30th May 1944 Directive of the Military Council of the 1st Baltic Front

"To insure concealment during preparations and to achieve surprise in conduct of the operation

1 Order:

"...A. Concerning Concealment of Troops and Maintenance of Military Secrecy

"1. All movements of troops and rear services are to be done only at night between 2200 and 0400 with an exactly determined travel distance. Do not try to travel long distances. End marches in forested, sheltered regions. Do not permit columns to stretch out or lagging subunits to move during daytime.

"No matter where troops and their rear services may be when light comes, all roads must be perfectly still; all movement must stop.

"2. Motor vehicles can travel only at night with headlights out. Set up white signs that are plainly visible at night on the roads.

Paint the front part of the hood and rear sides of vehicles white. Traveling at high speed or passing vehicles on the march is categorically forbidden.

"The movement of troops, transports, motor vehicles, and combat equipment must follow strictly routes that are planned and scouted in advance, with no diversion to parallel roads and trails...

"5. When single enemy planes or small groups appear antiaircraft weapons and troop units on the march and at unit lines must not open fire. It is permitted to fire at enemy aircraft operating in large groups and threatening troops on the march and at unit lines...

"8. During the entire period of regrouping and preparation for action maintain the existing fire conditions. Establish a procedure for ranging artillery and mortar weapons that insures concealment of the artillery grouping in the main axis.

"9. When enemy aircraft appear during tactical exercises subunits and units must take cover immediately and, according to predetermined signals, quickly deploy and simulate defensive construction on natural lines.

"10. Establish rigorous control at communications centers and do not permit discussion, especially open discussion of activities on wire communications.

"11. Make defensive subjects paramount in the Red Army press, and categorically forbid running any articles and notices that in any way treat questions of preparation for upcoming actions.

"12. No activity (troop movement, hauling supplies, commander's reconnaissance, and so on) can be permitted or carried out before steps have been taken to conceal this activity.

"For this purpose:

- "- Select one assistant chief of staff at all unit and formation headquarters to be assigned to work out instructions for camouflaging troops in all types of combat activity and to see that specially designated officers monitor this closely;
- "- Army and corps commanders must establish an order for commander's reconnaissance which precludes clustering of such groups. Commander's reconnaissance groups may only travel on roads and trails where defensive forces ordinarily travel;

- "- In zones scheduled for vigorous actions, step up defensive works, paying special attention to the quality (convincingness) of construction on dummy minefields and the like.

"B. Concerning Discipline on the March and at Unit Lines

"1. Raise standards demanded of subordinate commanders and troops, and continuously explain to them the rules of troop behavior on the march, at unit positions, and on the job.

"2. Persistently explain to troops and demand that they increase vigilance, especially on the march, and (maintain - editor) military secrecy.

"3. Establish constant checks by officers on the behavior of troops on the march and at unit lines.

"4. Prohibit familiarization flights over territory occupied by the enemy for the personnel of new units joining the air army. Only the leaders can be authorized to make such flights, a day or two before the start of action. In this case establish an overflight zone whose depth guarantees that the plane can land in our territory if damaged by enemy fire...

"C. Concerning the Provost Service

"1. The entire front region should be broken into the following zones for purposes of more precise organization of the provost service:

"a. The front zone, from the line of front bases (city of Nevel') to the line of army bases (Zheleznitsa, Bychikha). The organization of provost work in this zone is assigned to the chief of staff of the front;

"b. Army zone, from the line of army bases (Zheleznitsa, Bychikha) to the line of division exchange points;

"c. Troop zones, from the line of division exchange points to the forward edge of defense.

"Organization of provost service in the army and troop zone and in the unit areas should be assigned to the military councils of the armies and commanders of the corps...

"3. Provost and security service must be organized and carried out strictly on all front, army, and troop roads beginning at 1800 of 2 June 1944...

"Each provost must be given a group of officers from the army and front reserve and entire rifle subunits and units to perform provost duty on the roads and in troop areas.

"Determination of the composition of the group of officers and subunits for provost service must be based on the following considerations:

"a. One provost officer post with two officers for each 3-5 kilometers of road and one two-man post operated by soldiers and sergeants for every 1-2 kilometers of road;

"b. Two officers and 3-5 two-man posts for each battalion in the troop unit area...

"5. Front and army signal chiefs must insure constant wire communication and telephones on all routes, at every officer provost post and every provost office. Provost officers in charge of roads and regions must be given the necessary mobile equipment for this purpose...

"7. To insure concealed movement of troops, trains, vehicle transport, combat equipment, and individual groups of soldiers and officers and to camouflage engineer work to prepare the springboard for the offensive, immediately determine the ground enemy's fields of vision in the forward zone (troop zone) and organize the strictest provost and security service. Take steps to establish vertical screens. Prohibit daytime travel by all motor vehicles (including cars) through fields of visibility and set markers at the boundaries of fields of visibility with especially rigorous provost officer posts.

"8. Determine the limit for truck traffic in a day figuring 100 trucks for each army and front unit.

"The front chief of rear services should make up and issue special passes to armies and front units for daytime vehicle traffic within the established limit.

"9. Categorically forbid written communications relating to activities being carried on. Only the restricted circle of scheduled persons should be permitted to see the content of essential documents, and documents must not go beyond the headquarters that prepared them.

"10. Prohibit direct submission of requests from directorates, staffs, and chiefs of the arms of troops to the corresponding directorates of the fronts, sending them only through the army and front staffs.

"11. In reports to front headquarters at 2100 each day report the results of the concealment inspection.

"Do not put this Directive in written or printed form; disseminate it to the commanders of regiments and detached battalions by personal communication and instruction of subordinate commanders.

Guards Army Gen I.
Bagramayan, com-
mander of the 1st
Baltic Front

Lt Gen Leonov, mem-
ber of the Military
Council of the 1st
Baltic Front

Lt Gen Kurasov, chief
of staff of the 1st
Baltic Front

30 May 1944"

(TsAMO SSSR, fund 235, inventory 2074, file 75, sheets 2-10).

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TACTICS OF U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 53-57

[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by docent and candidate of military sciences Col (Ret) A. Sinitskiy: "Some Tactical Conclusions from the Experience of the Aggressive War of the U.S. Against Vietnam"]

[Text] The United States' war of aggression in Vietnam lasted more than 10 years and ended with the victory of the Vietnamese people. Analyzing the colonial aspirations of the imperialists, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said: "It is no longer simple for them to rely on direct armed intervention in the affairs of the liberated countries. The last major action of this type, the U. S. war against the people of Vietnam, ended in too devastating and shameful a failure to arouse any willingness to repeat such actions."¹

The U. S. ground forces sent to South Vietnam experienced the effectiveness of the diverse tactical procedures of units of the People's Liberation Army and partisans of Vietnam. Their former tactics, taken from World War II times were plainly unsuited for the new situation. The aggressor had to borrow many things from his enemy in the area of jungle combat tactics. There was no front line in South Vietnam. Fighting took place on roads and near cities, military bases, and other vitally important points. In 1968 American troops were basically waging defensive actions, holding on to tactically important regions and points. There were offensive actions in some sectors using battalions made up of companies with streamlined composition. Tanks were used where terrain permitted. They supported infantry and attacked 75-100 meters in front of infantry battle formations.

According to the assessments of foreign military specialists, the combat experience of American forces demonstrated that traditional infantry tactics are unsound in jungle conditions, although infantry battalions were supported by massed mortar and artillery fire and air

strikes. Success can be achieved on open terrain with such fire support. In thick jungle, however, fire superiority amounted to nothing. The natural features of South Vietnam were a natural barrier to artillery and tanks. They were unable to escort the infantry to the full depth of combat. Therefore, infantry subunits were forced to rely entirely on their own weapons, rifles and grenade throwers. Tactical aviation spent only a limited time over the field of battle and its actions were ineffective. Units and subunits of the People's Liberation Army had an unquestionable advantage in tactical procedures. The tactics of the American infantry amounted to establishing places of enemy concentration using small reconnaissance groups and patrols, and then bringing in the main forces, cutting off enemy paths of withdrawal, and calling in artillery fire and air strikes against the regions.²

The military press gives an example of offensive actions by the 9th Regiment of a marine division of the U. S. Army. The regiment's battle formation was constructed in one echelon. The regiment advanced on a front of 14.4 kilometers, with 4.8 kilometers for a battalion. The attack was carried out in three stages: concentration, rear support, and the attack proper.³ Such actions were used extensively in Vietnam.

During offensive actions considerable attention was devoted to organizing cooperation among infantry, artillery, and aviation. The foreign press tells how cooperation was organized when one company of an American regiment was attacking a strongpoint. It advanced in one echelon. Fire support helicopters coming from various directions fired machine guns, grenade launchers, and missiles at the strongpoint. Artillery used 105-millimeter guns to neutralize fire points and destroyed the defensive structures of the Vietnamese forces. Tactical aviation delivered bomb strikes in the assigned sector. But despite the fire superiority of the American forces, they were unable to take the strongpoints.⁴

Combat experience confirmed that small subunits play a significant part. It is no mistake that the war in South Vietnam is sometimes called a "war of platoons." Military observers in this case are referring to the experience of special forces which usually operated in small groups of 12 persons.

The Americans developed special tactics for combat actions by small subunits to suit the conditions of South Vietnam.⁵ In this connection the U. S. command attached great importance to the training of sergeants. As the foreign press reported, the use of new types of weapons and conducting combat actions in small subunits in isolated sectors demanded that sergeants show intelligent initiative and make independent decisions. They had to train their men correctly and control squads intelligently in mobile types of combat, especially at night.⁶

In defensive fighting the American forces made broad use of field-type fortification and devoted considerable attention to defending the most important strongpoints and using snipers, who operated in pairs. One

of them observed the field of battle and the other destroyed the targets detected.

The specific conditions of the theater of war revealed the great potential of artillery, whose missions included: preparation for and waging fire against regions where units of the People's Liberation Army were concentrated, preventing them from approaching the field of battle, supporting air mobile operations, fire support for reconnaissance groups and infantry, motorized infantry, and air mobile subunits, covering friendly airfields, supply depots, and other military facilities, lighting up an area with illumination shells, and so on. Artillery troops used the following types of fire to accomplish these missions: harrassing fire and interdiction fire; artillery strikes and defensive fire. Harrassing fire and interdiction fire were carried on by heavy guns to pin down an enemy preparing to attack and make it difficult to organize communications and transport ammunition, food, and other supplies. Defensive fire was used chiefly during defensive actions.⁷ The combat region was divided into two zones for better control of artillery fire: the zone where no limitation was placed on fire from any guns, and the zone in which fire was waged with authorization of the higher headquarters.

The first characteristic of the aggressor's artillery tactics was its decentralization. This was a result of the fact that combat actions were carried on by small subunits in isolated sectors. Therefore, artillery weapons were assigned to subunit commanders who used them on the basis of the situation.

The second characteristic was broad maneuvering with artillery by air. Artillery batteries were moved in helicopters to the enemy rear and opened fire against regions of probable concentration of People's Liberation Army troops or partisan detachments.

The third characteristic was that the Americans resorted to the method of supporting ground forces from artillery fire bases. For fire support of infantry in forested mountain terrain artillery fire bases were set up on hills, so that they could fire in any direction. The guns were moved to the fire bases by helicopter or airplane. Fire support was carried out from these fire bases at the request of the commanders of infantry subunits. As the infantry advanced the artillery would move to new fire bases from which artillery support would continue.⁸

Questions of organizing artillery reconnaissance also received considerable attention. The missions of reconnaissance in the interests of artillery were assigned to army reconnaissance airplanes and helicopters; pilots used visual observation and photography.

The cooperation between artillery and infantry was supported by artillery observers and signal officers, who were assigned to the infantry subunits. Correction of artillery fire was done by the officers. They were located in helicopters or on the tops of mountains and hills both in areas occupied by friendly troops and in enemy territory.

Foreign specialists observe that the experience of the war in Vietnam provided many instructive things for the use of tanks. Up to 100 armored subunits, equivalent to companies, operated there. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was the largest unit.

Armored forces performed the following missions: reconnaissance; support of attacks by infantry subunits; combing the terrain; pursuing retreating subunits; escorting columns on the march, and the like. They operated both independently (in reconnaissance) and in cooperation with other arms of troops (after detecting the enemy crews would dismount, go into the firefight, and at the same time call in army aviation to help).

During attacks in the jungle tanks moved ahead of the infantry because they were not threatened by enemy antitank weapons. This procedure reduced the losses of infantry subunits from antipersonnel mines, ambushes, and traps, which were used extensively by units of the People's Liberation Army and partisans. Tanks were often used to pin down enemy infantry from the front while infantry units enveloped and encircled the open flanks of the enemy.⁹

In defensive actions tanks equipped with night-vision instruments and searchlights were effective weapons in night combat. Primary and standby positions were prepared for them. Data for waging fire at night was communicated to the crews. Considerable attention here was devoted to organizing cooperation with infantry, artillery, and aviation. Tank-borne assault parties were used in counterattacks. When counterattacks were successful the tanks continued in pursuit of the enemy. M-48 tanks can wage fire from an enclosed position, but owing to the difficulties of observation and control of fire they did not do so.¹⁰

During combat actions in cities small groups of tanks were used in close cooperation with infantry, artillery, army aviation, and sapper subunits.

The U.S. command formed improvised tank groups. Their standard composition included a company of tanks, a company of infantry in armored personnel carriers, a battery of self-propelled guns, a reconnaissance platoon, and a sapper platoon. The groups were assigned to carry on reconnaissance and to seize and hold important objects. They were supplied by air using helicopters.¹¹

Armored personnel carriers were used both to transport infantry and to haul supplies and evacuate wounded from the field of battle. In defensive actions tanks and armored personnel carriers were used as stationary and mobile fire points. The military press observes that tanks were used ineffectively because they were not used en masse, but rather in small subunits and groups. In addition they were used to make passages through minefields, as tractors, and to prepare column roads in thick jungle.¹²

In the initial period of the war in South Vietnam the Americans used air mobile operations extensively. During them ground subunits and units with weapons were transported by helicopter to collect reconnaissance data, capture a definite region, and develop the success. The crucial stage of an air mobile operation was landing the first (assault) echelon. Helicopters equipped with signal rockets and smoke grenades marked the landing zone. After landing the party moved out in the attack direction and entered battle against the enemy.

According to reports in the press, the commanders of People's Liberation Army units figured out the aggressors' plans, determined the landing zones, and left the area; then later they would carry out a concealed maneuver and strike a tangible blow against the landing party. Then the U. S. command began taking steps toward operational concealment and deception. False rumors and fictitious documents were spread and artillery and air strikes were delivered against regions where a landing was supposedly contemplated. All this was needed to make the People's Liberation Army send its forces to the false axis. However, these tricks were exposed in time.

The American command also carried out what were called secret air mobile operations. The essential point of them was that during the night one or two days before the start of the operation groups would be landed near the landing region. They would capture the landing zones and dig in there until arrival of the main landing party.

Based on the combat experience of American forces in the mountainous regions of South Vietnam certain specialists in the United States believe that air mobile forces organized in a division and equipped with helicopters and vertical takeoff-landing airplanes will be used extensively in mountainous theaters. They will be able to seize and hold mountain passages, passes, peaks, and valleys and wage offensive and defensive actions, striking the enemy in the flank and rear. The press observes that U. S. air mobile troops must be ready for mountain warfare in the vast spaces of Europe and Asia. Massed use of helicopters and vertical takeoff-landing airplanes affects tactics in such warfare. It reduces troop dependence on ground lines of communication and increases their rate of advance. Troops must be well prepared, trained, and specially equipped for successful actions in mountainous conditions.

U. S. military theoreticians, basing their thinking on the experience of the aggressive war against the people of Vietnam, conclude that the fight against patriotic forces requires formation of special-purpose detachments, the creation of new streamlined divisions which will be located in particular regions of the world where the national liberation movement is growing. These divisions, they believe, should have several light infantry brigades and one or a few brigades of support troops in their composition. In addition, it is contemplated that a group of military advisors will be formed with them. The duties of such advisors include teaching forms and methods of combatting the

partisans of a country where the national liberation movement is developing.¹³

American forces were rightfully repulsed by the armed forces of Vietnam and the entire Vietnamese people, who were defending a righteous cause, their freedom and independence. But the Vietnamese patriots were not alone before the enemy. All the progressive forces of the world, the peoples' of the socialist countries, in particular the Soviet Union, were helping Vietnam.

The armed forces of Vietnam accumulated rich military experience during the bloody and protracted struggle against the American aggressors, and they used this knowledge creatively and skillfully to repulse the Chinese forces who invaded their country on 17 February 1979.

The Chinese adventurers were defeated. The Vietnamese people received the support of many peace-loving peoples of the world, above all the Soviet Union, who provided enormous political support and comprehensive aid.

FOOTNOTES

1. Brezhnev, L. I., "Velikiy Oktyabr' i Progress Chelovechestva" [Great October and the Progress of Humanity], Moscow, Politizdat, 1977, p 22.
2. ARMY 1967, No 2, pp 56-59.
3. MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 1959, No 7, pp 32-40.
4. INFANTRY 1970, No 4, pp 6-11.
5. DATA 1968, No 12, pp 22-24.
6. INFANTRY 1970, No 4, pp 22-27.
7. ORDNANCE 1967, No 52.
8. MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 1959, No 9.
9. INFANTRY 1969, No 4, pp 45-48.
10. MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 1969, No 7, pp 41-44.
11. ARMOR 1968, No 3, pp 5-10.
12. WEHRKUNDE 1970, No 6, pp 305-311.
13. MILITARY REVIEW 1970, No 12, pp 86-92.

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PREWAR POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION WORK DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 68-71

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Col A. Krupennikov, candidate of historical sciences and Honored Cultural Worker of the RSFSR: "Party Political Work Among the Troops of the Western Military Districts on the Eve of the War"]

[Text] By the start of the Great Patriotic War the troop covering the Western borders of the Soviet Union were joined territorially into the Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special, and Odessa military districts. Of the Red Army and Navy's total strength of 5 million, more than half, 2.9 million, were serving in these districts and the fleets contiguous to them on the eve of the war.

Political and military indoctrination of the personnel of the troops of the border districts was organized on the basis of general instructions and directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the People's Commissar of Defense, and the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, but a number of local circumstances were also taken into account.

In the first place, most of the formations and units were stationed in territories where Soviet power had just been restored. Therefore, the class struggle there was not yet finished and some of the population, primarily the remaining representatives of the exploiter classes, held bourgeois nationalistic views.

In the second place, the troops of the western military districts were on the first line of defense of the USSR borders, in direct contact with the most aggressive and malicious force of imperialism, the armies of Nazi Germany and its satellites.

In the third place, most of the troops were stationed in new regions with inadequately developed or outdated housing, training, storage, and transport facilities and where enormous work was underway to build defensive fortifications on the new state border. Considering these special circumstances and the real, increased threat of an attack on our country by Hitler's Germany, the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the party bodies of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, and the Baltic republic together with the command and political organs of the Red Army took vigorous steps to strengthen and improve the entire system of party political work among the troops of the border districts. The principal objective was to indoctrinate fighting men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism, the fraternity and friendship of the USSR peoples, high political vigilance, hatred for fascism and imperialism, and readiness for heroic defense of the socialist Fatherland.

The military councils and directorates of political propaganda in the districts had an enormous guiding and organizing role in this work.

In the area of party organizational work special attention was directed to growth of the party and Komsomol by recruiting leading soldiers in the primary military specializations, above all in the companies and batteries and by forming full-fledged party organization in these subunits as well as Komsomol groups in the platoons, squads, and teams.

The February 1938 decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Congress Party (Bolshevik) entitled "Admission of Red Army Men to the Party," the new By-Laws adopted by the 18th party congress, and the uniform conditions established by the congress for admission to the party helped significantly to fill army party organizations with young communists. The 10 July 1940 decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) on questions of further improvement of selection for the party and work with candidates for membership in the party was also important.

Guided by these documents, party organizations in the five western military districts admitted 24,429 new members between January and May 1941, including 14,950 to membership in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik).¹ They included fighting men from 58 nations and peoples of our country.² Most of the persons admitted to the party represented technical arms of troops, above all aviation and tank troops, but also artillery, engineer, and other units equipped with complex combat equipment.

On 31 May 1941 230,600 of the 501,173 members and candidates for membership in the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) enrolled in army party organizations were in the five western military districts. These districts had 46 percent of all army communists.³ The army Komsomol became more active on the basis of the demands of the statute on Komsomol organizations in the Red Army ratified by the party Central Committee in 1938. On 31 March 1941 831,236 of the 1,726,046 Komsomol members in the entire Red Army were in the forces of the western districts.⁴ Thus, by the start of the war roughly half of all the communists and Komsomol members in the Red Army were serving on the western frontiers.⁵ Furthermore, there were Komsomol organizations in all companies and batteries and party organizations had been formed in half of these subunits.⁶

The experience gained during the fighting at Khasan, Khalkhin-Gol, and during the Finnish-Soviet armed conflict plus World War II, which had begun, demanded a radical reorganization of the entire system of troop combat and political training and practical implementation of the slogan "Learn what is needed in war and how it is needed in war." Special attention here was devoted to troop field training, fire training, and raising combat readiness. All these things imposed higher requirements for party political work, which became centered in the subunits.

Progress in performing the missions of combat and political training was discussed broadly at district and fleet party conferences held in November and December 1940. The party conference of the Baltic Special Military District, for example, took note of the useful work experience of the political propaganda branch of the 67th Rifle Division. Workers in this branch went directly to the companies and batteries to teach deputy commanders for political affairs and party and Komsomol organizers, giving them practical demonstrations of how to organize and carry on party political work starting from the specific missions of the subunit. This division was the leader in the district for all indexes of combat and political training and for state of military discipline.⁷ At the start of the Great Patriotic War the soldiers and commanders of this division showed massive heroism and unprecedented persistence in the defense of Liyepaya.

Basing themselves on V. I. Lenin's teaching that "development of the consciousness of the masses remains, as always, the foundation and chief content of all our work,"⁸ political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations devoted a great deal of attention to political education of personnel, ideological indoctrination, and instilling in the men the high moral and fighting qualities necessary in war.

In political training for middle-level and senior command personnel emphasis was put on studying the short course in the history of the Communist Party and Marxist-Leninist doctrine of war and the army. During 1940 and 1941 the history of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) was also studied at political training periods for sergeants in their first and second years and at day and evening schools for party activists. By the end of 1940 in the Baltic Special Military District, for example, 20,349 fighting men had studied the history of the party,⁹ while in the five districts we are considering the total was about 100,000.

The political training period was the basic form of political indoctrination for soldiers and sergeants. The political agencies of the units and formations organized them and selected and trained group leaders.

In February 1939 the journal POLITUCHIBA KRASNOARMEYTSA [Political Training of the Red Army Men] began being published to help political training group leaders. The "Ponobiye Dlya Gruppovodov Politzanyatiy" [Manual for Political Training Group Leaders], which covered all subjects of the program, was published in an edition of 300,000.

In the spring and early summer of 1941 political training periods devoted a large place to studying the military-political situation in Europe and uncovering the aggressive essence of imperialism and the plundering policies of fascist Germany. The Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Worker-Peasant Red Army gave the border districts this orientation in its directive letter of 30 April 1941 entitled "Results of the Inspection of Political Training Periods." This letter said: "Red Army men and NCO's are not receiving sufficient explanation of the fact that World War II is being brought to a new part of the world by both the belligerents. Germany has undertaken the path of conquest and seizure. They are not receiving adequate explanation of the fact that expansion of the imperialist World War II creates a direct military threat to our country."¹⁰

Two important areas of work by political agencies and party organizations were explaining to personnel the text of the military oath ratified by Ukaze of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in January 1939 and explaining the new regulations and manuals which summarized the experience gained by Soviet troops during combat in the Far East in 1938 and 1939.

The Red Army press played an enormous part in political indoctrination of personnel. Daily newspapers were published in all districts and enjoyed great popularity among the troops. In its review for 1939 the journal PROPAGANDIST I AGITATOR RKKA [Red Army Propagandist and Agitator] observed that the district newspapers KRASNAYA ARMIYA (Kiev Special Military District) and NA STRAZHE RODINY (Leningrad Military District) "are the constant companions of army propagandists and agitators."¹¹

Newspapers were published in every army, corps, division, brigade, and school. By the start of 1941 there were 32 newspapers with a total circulation of 158,000 being published in the Baltic Special Military District.¹² Political agencies paid great attention to disseminating progressive know-how in troop training and indoctrination by means of the press, spreading stories of military heroism in battle against the enemy, and seeing that this information was true.

Movies, radio, libraries and clubs, amateur theatricals, physical training, and sports were used broadly in the interests of political and military indoctrination. The following facts indicate the extent of this work. In the fall of 1940 the Kiev Special Military District had an amateur theatrical competition in which 20,000 persons participated, 14,000 of them Komsomol members.¹³

In the February 1941 all army cross-country skiing and hiking events 752,910 of the 2,053,100 participants from the Red Army came from the five western districts.¹⁴ The Leningrad Military District was one of the leaders in this event.

The Red Army houses and clubs stepped up their work with the families of servicemen before the war. By the summer of 1941 the Leningrad Military District alone had trained 6,290 persons, primarily the wives of sergeants and officers, for work as communications technicians, drivers, nurses, and the like.¹⁵

The picture was similar in the other districts. And how helpful these combat specializations learned by our women proved to be during the harsh years of war!

Some work was also done to indoctrinate fighting men in the combat traditions of the Civil War and the heroic feats performed in the fighting at Lake Khasan, at the Khalkhin Gol, and on the Karelian Isthmus. The 255th Rifle Regiment of the 123rd Order of Lenin Rifle Division introduced a ritual in memory of Red Army man S. Kh. Yakovlev, who died heroically in the fighting against the White Finns. His name was permanently entered on the unit roll. At evening inspection the commander would read off the hero's name and the crack unit would respond: "Hero of the Soviet Union Red Army and Yakovlev died at his battle position, defending the security of our Motherland."¹⁶

Display windows and stands devoted to combat history and telling about the heroic deeds of the heroes and winners of Orders were set up at many Red Army Houses and in the formations and units in response to the directives of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda on 15 January 1941 entitled "Indoctrination of Personnel in Combat Tradition." The first troop museums were formed. Books and pamphlets were published on the history of units and formations. This work was particularly vigorous in the 16th, 30th, 25th, 15th, and 24th rifle divisions and the 5th Cavalry Division, which sent special representatives to the Central State Archive of the Red Army to find and collect the necessary material.¹⁷

Writers and journalists visited the districts on instructions from the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda in order to give practical help in writing the combat histories of the units and formations. Among these writers were A. T. Tvardovskiy, V. V. Vishnevskiy, N. I. Zamoshkin, and M. L. Matusovskiy. They helped repair the pamphlet "Combat Traditions of the Red Army" for mass publication.

But there were also significant shortcomings in the party political work being done. They were seen above all in the fact that elements of formalism and stereotyping occurred in the activities of certain political agencies and individual political workers. Party political activities were frequently carried on in isolation from the plans and missions of combat training and specific features of the arms of troops and locale were not always considered. Certain diplomatic steps and statements by the Soviet Government concerning mutual relations between the USSR and Germany were interpreted incorrectly in some places, resulting in an underestimation of the danger that fascist Germany would attack the USSR. Complacency and carelessness were not completely rooted out everywhere.

However, the principal and determining feature of party political work was that the commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations of the border military district, carrying out the decisions of the party to strengthen our western borders, in general accomplished their mission. By their intense and purposeful work on political and military indoctrination of the masses of soldiers they generally completed the process of shaping the spirit of the courageous defender of our Motherland.

By the start of the Great Patriotic War great moral-political potential had been developed in the Red Army and it enabled us not only to endure the most difficult and mortally dangerous initial period of the war but also to prepare the essential conditions for a basic turning point in the course of the war and the complete defeat of the German fascist aggressors.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], fund 32, inventory 11289, file 845, sheets 154-156, 159-162.
2. Ibid., file 846, sheets 77-78, 111-114, 118-119, 121, 124, 125.
3. Ibid., file 845, sheets 154, 156, 159-162.
4. Ibid., file 847, sheets 5, 6, 9, 12, 14 (Communists who were members of the Komsomol were not included in this count — author).
5. The figures given in the article for number of communists and Komsomol members do not count the Navy and Border troops.
6. TsAMO op. cit., fund 32, inventory 11309, file 15, sheet 44.
7. Ibid., inventory 11289, file 148, sheets 360, 361.
8. Lenin, V. I., "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], vol 13, p 376.
9. TsAMO..., op. cit., fund 32, inventory 11289, file 148, sheet 351.
10. Ibid., inventory 11302, file 4, sheet 117.
11. PROPAGANDIST I AGITATOR REKA 1940, No 4, p 37.
12. TsAMO..., op. cit., fund 32, inventory 11289, file 148, sheet 358.
13. Ibid., inventory 11310, file 7, sheet 62.
14. Ibid., inventory 11315, file 4, sheets 325-330; inventory 11315, file 21, sheets 21, 180.

15. Ibid., file 19, sheets 63-65.

16. Ibid., inventory 11310, file 8, sheet 80.

17. Ibid., inventory 11309, file 9, sheet 155.

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WORK METHODS OF MILITARY HISTORIAN DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 75-77

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Col Med Serv (Res) V. Fedotov, docent, candidate of medical sciences, and senior scientific staff member of the USSR Ministry of Defense Military Medical Museum: "On Managing the Personal Archives of the Military Historian"]

[Text] The work of a military historian involves the necessity of accumulating a large amount of material containing various types of information. This makes it necessary to put one's personal archives in order.


Work should be done by setting up a uniform system of recording and storing all types of materials: journal articles, outlines, newspaper clippings, typed copies and photocopies, microfilms, negatives, sound recordings, and the like. Only if they are all properly recorded and given an exact storage place will it be possible to retrieve the information they contain quickly. This is done by broad use of card files and keeping two simple record forms.

The first is a log of periodicals read in which a page is allocated for each journal, collection of articles, collection of works, and other similar publication. Each page has columns drawn so that marks can be made in the book after looking through an issue. The other book or log is in alphabetical order and is used to record all citations of interest. The names of authors and works and publication data are written here. In those cases where the literature in one form or another is in the personal library, an appropriate mark is made in the log.


After a particular source goes into the alphabetic log it receives its own "number," consisting of the first letter of the author's last name (or of the title of the work) and the ordinal number under which it was recorded, for example A-1, B-3, X-19, and so on. All details about the particular work can be found in the alphabetic log using the number.

Figure 1 below shows examples of abbreviated entries on personal archive catalog cards. The general procedure for handling literature is represented in Figure 2.


(a) ПОЛНОЕ
ОПИСАНИЕ




СОКРАЩЕННЫЕ
(b) ЗАПИСИ
НАЗВАНИЕ (c)



ФАМИЛИЯ АВТОРА, ГОД (d)



КРАТКОЕ ОПИСАНИЕ (e)



Key: (a) Complete Description;
(b) Abbreviated Entries;
(c) Name;
(d) Author's Name, year;
(e) Key Word.

Figure 1.

Another way to improve the personal archive is to use the card file form to store reference material. Topical fact files should be established whose cards contain certain information concerning theaters of military action, the composition of the forces of the two sides, particular operations, military leaders, and so on.

For the military historian it is equally important to master the use of microfilm as a method of recording and storing information. This offers practically unlimited opportunities to accumulate information and save considerable time. A microfilm of a book, journal, or newspaper can be ordered at any large library or made oneself if one has the most elementary knowledge and skills in the field of photography. The technical means necessary for this are completely available to anyone.

Finally, one other area is putting the storage of all types of working materials in order. When they are put in a desk one must be sure that everything is acceptable and visible. Visibility is achieved by separate storage and clear marking.

Methods of arranging and storing particular types of materials in personal archives have their own specific features. This concerns primarily




Figure 2.

- Key:
- (a) Log of Periodicals Read;
 - (b) Bibliographic File;
 - (c) Personal Card Files;
 - (d) Alphabetic Log;
 - (e) Fact File.


books, which should be arranged according to a retrieval method. It is essential to single out the most frequently used reference work. Alphabetic order is most expedient when finding books using a personal catalog. In this case the numbers of the books are written on their back, for example A-4, B-6, and so on. To find things faster the alphabet is written in the margin of dictionaries and subject headings are put in the margins of reference work.

In most cases it does not make sense to store entire periodical publications because only a few of the articles in them are interesting for one's own particular work. Therefore, the most convenient thing is to remove the necessary articles from the journal and file them, and then later collect them in brochures or bindings. In this way compact volumes that take minimum space are made. A note is made in the alphabetical log where the particular article has been filed (volume number and page in it).

Methods of storing all kinds of diverse material (typewritten and electrographic copies, photographs, clippings from newspapers and journals) depend on the type, format, number, use, and contemplated storage time. Above all one must try to keep everything on file, in boxes or envelopes.

Special boxes for 30 or 60 film sheets are used to store microfilm. The references to them in the alphabetic log or on the catalog cards include the box number, position in it, and frame of the film.

Figure 3 gives a general picture of the retrieval of materials in a personal archive.



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INSTRUCTOR OUTLINE FOR NAVAL HISTORY LESSON

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[Article, published "to assist teachers of military history," under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information," by Vice Adm A. Kosov, naval deputy commander for naval educational institutions and chief of the Directorate for Naval Educational Institutions: "The Pacific Fleet in the War Against Imperialist Japan"]

[Text] The program of military history at higher naval schools envisions a two-hour lecture on this subject. The basic readings for it comprise the appropriate chapters from the following books: "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg. Kratkaya Istoriya" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. Short History], Voenizdat, 1970; "Istoriya Voenno-Morskogo Iskusstva" [History of Naval Art], Voenizdat, 1969; S. Ye. Zakharov et al, "Krasnoznamenny Tikhookeanskiy Flot" [The Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet], Voenizdat, 1973; "Boevoy Put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota" [Combat History of the Soviet Navy], Voenizdat, 1974; "Morskoy Atlas" [Naval Atlas], Vol 3, Pt 2, Moscow, 1963. Additional reading can be found in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 8 for 1975, No 8 for 1976, and No 9 for 1977.

In our opinion, it is advisable to consider the following questions in the lecture:

1. The situation in the Far East at the beginning of military actions (10 minutes);
2. Assistance by the Red Banner Amur Flotilla to forces of the Soviet Army in the Manchurian offensive operation (20 minutes);
3. Actions of the Pacific Ocean Fleet to take ports and bases in North Korea and to liberate South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (40 minutes);

4. Results and conclusions from the actions of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Amur Naval Flotilla in the war with Japan (10 minutes).

About 10 minutes must be allotted for the introduction and answering questions.

After working out the text one must think about the method of giving the lecture and identify the material that will be narrated as well as that which will be given to the students by means of maps, tables, and slides.

The following maps should be prepared: "General course of the military actions of the Soviet Armed Forces against Japan in 1945"; "Combat actions of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla"; "Landing of assault parties in ports of North Korea"; "Combat actions to liberate South Sakhalin"; "Landing the assault party on Shumshu Island." The film strip "Combat actions of the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Red Banner Amur Flotilla in the war against imperialist Japan in 1945" and the table showing the ratio of forces between the two sides are also recommended.

In the introduction it is advisable to stress the timeliness of the subject, relate it to material already covered, and call the students' attention to the most important aspects in work with the recommended reading.

When characterizing the general situation in the theater by August 1945, it is desirable to point out that the defeat of fascist Germany and its satellites predetermined the outcome of World War II as a whole. But military actions were still being waged in the Far East. The Allied Supreme Command believed that the armed forces of the United States and England were not enough for a rapid victory over the Japanese aggressor. It must also be observed that the situation in the Far East had been extremely tense throughout the war against fascist Germany. The Japanese militarists provoked incidents, violated land, air, and sea boundaries, and sank our ships. Japan could always have begun a war at a favorable moment. It had rejected the joint declaration of the United States, England, and China on 26 July 1945 concerning unconditional surrender. Faithful to its duty as an Ally the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan. It was a just war and had these objectives: eliminate the one remaining center of World War II; spare the peoples of Eastern Asia further sacrifices and suffering; deprive militaristic Japan of the possibility of carrying out aggressive plans against the USSR and China, and thereby create conditions for establishing peace throughout the world. The principal military strategic objective was to smash the striking force of Japanese militarism, the Kwantoon Army. Plans envisioned surrounding it, breaking it into parts, and wiping them out.

When speaking about the ratio of forces between the two sides and showing it on the tables, it is important to emphasize that our Supreme

Command was able to concentrate a grouping of armed forces with rich combat experience in the Far East. In a short time it mauled the Kwantoon Army of almost 1 million.

Navy men made a large contribution to the great victory over imperialist Japan. The combat actions of the Pacific Ocean Fleet (commanded by Adm I. S. Yumashev, member of the military council Lt Gen Shore Serv S. Ye. Zakharov, and chief of staff Vice Adm A. S. Frolov) and the Amur Flotilla (commanded by Rear Adm N. V. Antonov, member of the military council Rear Adm M. G. Yakovenko, chief of staff Rear Adm A. M. Gushchin), involving a series of offensive operations, played a very important part in the rapid conquest of South Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and the ports of North Korea by our forces and facilitated the rapid advance of Soviet troops deep into Manchuria. The swift landing operations of the Pacific Fleet disrupted the Kwantoon Army's tie to the homeland and help completely surround it.

Cooperating with men of the 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Red Banner Amur Flotilla participated in the Manchurian Strategic (9 August to September), South Sakhalin (11-25 August), and Kuril Landing (18 August-1 September) operations. Their actions were coordinated with ground forces by Fleet Adm N. G. Kuznetsov, commander of Naval Forces and People's Commissar of the Navy.

In these and the following questions the teacher should reveal the role and importance of party political work and experience in organizing and maintaining cooperation between naval and ground forces.

It is advisable to begin the presentation of the second question with the short description of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, which consisted of four brigades of river ships, the Sretensk Detached Division of River Ships, and the Ussuri and Hankai separate detachments of armored boats. In all they had six monitors, 11 gun boats, 52 armored boats, seven mine cutters, 12 mine sweepers, 36 mine sweeper-cutters, and numerous auxiliary vessels. In addition, the flotilla had a fighter aviation regiment. At the start of military actions more than 100 border cutters were put under operational fleet control. The Sungari Flotilla opposing it had up to 30 fighting ships and boats, more than 100 auxiliary vessels, and three marine regiments. Moreover, the enemy had artillery at strong fortified points along the rivers.

The Red Banner Amur Flotilla, which was operationally subordinate to the 2nd Far Eastern Front, was given the missions of helping ground forces cross major water obstacles and take river beachheads, with subsequent buildup of forces and advance in the Sungari operational axis.

The deployment of the forces of the flotilla began on 8 August and was carried out secretly, under the guise of conducting regular exercises. The crossing of the Amur and Ussuri on the morning of 9 August went successfully. The Japanese were caught by surprise and began a

general retreat. At the same time, the 1st Brigade of river ships, commanded by Capt 2nd Rank V. A. Krinov, landed a party on Tatarskiy Island, which covered the approach to the mouth of the Sunguri. The 2nd Brigade of river ships, commanded by Capt 1st Rank L. B. Tankevich, landed a party near the mouth of the Ussuri and helped it take Fuyuan. After this ships of the flotilla traveled up the Amur and landed several more parties. By the onset of the second day of combat actions the entire right bank of the Amur between the mouth of the Ussuri and the mouth of the Sungari was cleared of enemy troops. Favorable conditions were created for development of the success of front troops in the Sungari axis.

On the morning of 10 August the crossing of the Amur near Blagoveshchensk began. On this day landing forces of the 2nd Red Banner Army, landed by ships of the Zeya-Bureya Brigade, commanded by Capt 1st Rank M. G. Voronkov, took the major strongpoint and city of Sakhalian. Just two days were needed to cross the water obstacles and take large beachheads.

The flotilla also played an important part in the Sungari operation. Ships were the forward detachments of the strike group of the front which advanced swiftly toward Harbin, not allowing the retreating enemy to dig in at intermediate lines. Control of their actions was exercised from the command ship Amur. The ships, in the vanguard of attacking units, traveled 930 kilometers from Fuyuan to Harbin in 12 days of fighting; more than 700 kilometers were along the Sungari. On the morning of 20 August they entered Harbin. On that same day the Sungari Flotilla began to lay down its arms.

The actions of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla were highly praised by Army Gen M. A. Purkayev, commander of the 2nd Far Eastern Front. The ships which served as the vanguard of forces of the 2nd Far Eastern Front crossed water obstacles such as the Amur, Ussuri, and Sungari rivers and thus speeded up the capture of major enemy strongpoints and Manchurian cities. In the Sakhalian axis alone the flotilla transported 87,000 men, 649 tanks, 889 field guns and mortars, 5,375 motor vehicles and tractors, 6,507 horses, and more than 18,000 tons of freight.

During presentation of this second question it is reasonable to use a table of the composition and location of the ships of our flotilla and the enemy flotilla. The table, prepared in advance, will give a more convincing picture of the qualitative and quantitative superiority of our forces and their better operational formation. As examples of brilliant combat actions one may refer to the crews of the ships commanded by Capt. 1st Rank V. D. Korner and Sr Lt I. A. Sornev, who were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. It is also interesting to note the participation of students at the Pacific Ocean Higher Naval School in combat action on ships of the flotilla. They had been on the ships for practical training. When combat actions began they were assigned battle posts and, as full-fledged members of the crew, took part in the fighting and landing operations and participated bravely as members of fire correction posts and reconnaissance groups. They were given government awards for courage and skillful actions.

It is advisable to begin treatment of the third question by listing the missions that faced the Pacific Ocean Fleet. They were disrupting the enemy's sealanes, securing our own lines of communication, preventing the Japanese from landing on the Soviet coast, and making it difficult for enemy ships to use North Korean ports as bases. Next it should be observed that landing operations to take the most important bases in North Korea, South Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands were the characteristic form of combat action in the fleet.

Considering that the ports of North Korea could be used to supply and evacuate Japanese troops, Adm I. S. Yumashev decided on successive landings in Yuki, Rasin, and Seisin. The operation was carried out at a high speed and caught the enemy by surprise. Fast fighting ships and naval aviation took part in it.

On the evening of 11 August in thick fog the landing party was landed right on the docks in the port of Yuki and on 12 and 13 August they were put ashore in the port of Rasin. Taking these ports created favorable conditions for a landing at the Seisin naval base, 130 miles from Vladivostok. Its port was equipped with docks and connected to the South Korean and Manchurian railroads. The city was circled by two lines of defense consisting of trenches and 180 permanent and earth-and-timber pillboxes connected by communications passages. The garrison at the base, with up to 4,000 soldiers and officers, could be reinforced with reserves at any time.

The plan of the operation to take this base envisioned preliminary air strikes to weaken the defense, surprise attacks by torpedo boats against transport and fighting ships located in the port, reconnaissance by force, and landing the main forces of the landing party directly on the docks and wharves. Twelve landing ships, seven transports, a destroyer, a mine tender, eight patrol ships, seven minesweepers, six small hunters, 18 torpedo boats, and 261 aircraft (188 bombers and 73 fighters) took part. The landing party had about 6,000 men.

As a result of the combined actions of the landing party, aviation, and ships, Seisin was completely cleared of enemy forces in the second half of 16 August and by day's end units of the 1st Far Eastern Front entered the liberated city. On 19 August a marine landing occupied Odetsin and on 21 August Genzan. The Pacific Ocean Fleet fulfilled the missions it was given.

Reviewing the tactical procedures and methods of operation of the all-arms forces in the landing operation, emphasis should be placed on the role and skill of the officers and the courage and heroism of Soviet navy men. It is useful here to give examples of skillful conduct of combat actions by the division of torpedo boats commanded by Capt Lt M. G. Malik and the landing detachment of Hero of the Soviet Union Sr Lt V. N. Leonov and to tell about navy pilot Jr Lt M. Ye. Yanko, who repeated the feat of Nikolay Gastello. An Ukase of the

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 14 September 1945 awarded V. N. Leonov his second Gold Star medal and the title Hero of the Soviet Union to M. Ye. Yanko (posthumously) and M. G. Malik.

Moving on to the South Sakhalin operation carried out by the 16th Army (commanded by Maj Gen L. G. Cherenisov), the 2nd Far Eastern Front, and the Northern Pacific Ocean Flotilla (commanded by Vice Adm. V. A. Andreyev), one should note the swift actions of the marine landing parties that took the ports of Toro, Esutoru, Maoka, and Otomari, which disrupted lines of communication, demoralized the enemy, and secured a break through his strong defensive line by forces of the 56th Rifle Corps, which liberated South Sakhalin, Russian land from ancient days.

The Kuril landing operation deserves considerable attention. It was conducted by forces of the Kamchatka Defensive Region (commanded by Maj Gen A. R. Gnechko) and the Petropavlovsk naval base (commanded by Capt 1st Rank D. G. Ponomarev). The operation was characterized by rapid conquest of the islands of the Kuril Arc by landing marine parties on unprepared shores in the face of a strong enemy antilanding defense.

In reviewing the course of the operation, it is advisable to show the organization of command and control by all-arms forces and the tactics used to land a large marine party (8,363 men, 95 guns, 123 mortars, and a great deal of other equipment and various materiel) on Shumshu Island and describe the detachment's courageous and heroic actions on shore. The bitter fighting during the assault on dominant hill 171 where communist PO 1st Class N. A. Vilkov and Komsomol member Smn P. I. Il'ich repeated the legendary feat of Aleksandr Matrosov can serve as a brilliant example of such actions.

When finishing the third question, it should be emphasized that the success of the landing operations carried out by the Pacific Ocean Fleet was a result of the increased fighting effectiveness of our forces, their enormous experience gained in the war against fascist Germany, and the unsurpassed moral and fighting qualities of Soviet fighting men. Precise cooperation between ground forces and the Pacific Ocean Fleet, their swift advance in axes where the enemy did not expect it, and dividing and wiping out the enemy by units were the distinctive features with respect to military and naval art. It should be remarked that during the aggressive factions of our navy the American and English navies halted their struggle against Japanese naval forces. Moreover, large numbers of mines placed near the ports of North Korea by the Americans made the actions of our fleet much more difficult.

The high pace and swiftness of the landing actions were possible because the navy had well-trained and prepared marine units and commanders and staffs skilled in preparing for and carrying out landing operations. The men of the Pacific fleet were the first Soviet naval

forces to use landing ships. This insured rapid landing of personnel and combat equipment on an unprepared shore without disrupting the pace of the operation. The fleet command reacted in time to the changing situation caused by the swift advance of our ground forces. The men participating in landing operations were prepared quickly, in up to 36 hours. The landings achieved surprise by various concealment activities, taking advantage of meteorological conditions and darkness, and swiftness of action.

In naval schools for surface vessels more attention should be given to the tactics of surface ships. They took a very active part in landing actions, using various tactical procedures: breaking right into the enemy port; landing assault parties on wharves under enemy fire; wiping out ships and vessels in ports with torpedoes; neutralizing shore guns and wiping out enemy manpower with ship guns.

Surface ships made broad use of smoke screens in delivering strikes against enemy ports and bases and also when putting landing parties ashore. It is interesting to observe that it was in the Pacific Ocean Fleet that a new tactical procedure appeared: combining mobile and stationary smoke screens. During combat actions the surface ships put down 56 smoke screens in all. Furthermore, they were used extensively in setting up defensive minefields, in defending our sea-lanes and disrupting enemy lanes, and in the performance of other combat missions.

During the combat actions the aviation of the Pacific Ocean Fleet had to perform four basic missions concurrently: carry on aerial reconnaissance; disrupt enemy sea-lanes and destroy enemy ships in port and at bases; support landing actions; provide air defense for navy facilities and convoys. One special feature of the situation that influenced performance of these missions was the fact that the sector boundary, established in conformity with Alliance obligations, for the zone of action of our naval and air forces ran 90-120 miles from our coast. Therefore, the air force could not operate outside this zone. The difficult weather situation with frequent rain and fog and low clouds also affected the conduct of combat operations. Nonetheless, naval aviation performed its assigned combat missions, carrying out more than 4,700 flights. On 9 and 10 August aviation made 14 strikes against North Korean ports alone, involving 968 flying missions. As a result of the actions of aviation and ships, in just two days the Japanese lost up to 20 transports and other vessels. Aviation used the following procedures in attacks on Yuki and Rasin: an anti-aircraft artillery suppression group was sent 2-3 minutes ahead of strike groups of ground-attack planes approaching targets. The strike groups were, for their part, divided into groups that operated from a dive and masthead bombing groups. The planes came at the target from different directions and after the attack headed off toward the sea, dropping sharply in altitude and picking up speed.

For schools dealing with submarines it is advisable to tell in greater detail about the organization of submarine deployment and actions and how the L-12 submarine sank an armed Japanese transport with a displacement of about 6,000 tons. It must be emphasized here that establishment of the sector boundary prevented our ships from operating in the regions of heavy enemy ship traffic.

The fourth question should be begun with the general military-political results of the war, observing here that the Manchurian base of operations of the Japanese imperialists, from which they spent many years preparing to attack the USSR, was eliminated in the Far East through the successful actions of the Soviet Armed Forces. Our victory resulted in the return of ancient Russian lands, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, which had been seized by the Japanese aggressors. Japan's surrender and the end of war in the Far East created favorable conditions for the people of Southeast Asia to struggle for their freedom and independence.

The swift and powerful strike by the USSR Armed Forces in the Far East ended quickly with the complete encirclement of the entire Kwantoon Army and its elimination by parts. It should be emphasized that precise cooperation among ground forces, aviation, and the fleet and flotilla played a significant part in this.

Then it is advisable to draw some brief conclusions concerning the successful performance of assigned missions by the Pacific Ocean Fleet and Red Banner Amur Flotilla and to point out that their personnel, in battle against the enemy, showed outstanding training, military skill, high moral and fighting qualities, and absolute devotion to their people, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Government. The Motherland was extremely grateful for the deeds of the navy men. More than 30,000 sailors of the Pacific Fleet received orders and medals and 52 were awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union. Nineteen ships of the units and formations of the fleet were given the honorary name "Guards," while 16 were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and 13 received honorary titles and names.*

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* Zakharov, S. Ye., et al, "Krasnoznamennyy Tikhookeanskii Flot"
[The Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet], Voenizdat, 1973, p 230.

GREATER USE OF TRAINING FILMS ADVOCATED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 pp 83-85

[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by Col A. Beloborodov, chief, and Col N. Kurkov, chief editor, both of USSR Ministry of Defense Division of Military Training Films: "Training Films, and Effective Teaching Aid"]

[Text] The adoption of the very latest weapons and combat equipment by the army and navy and continuing specialization of troops have increased the importance of combat and political training for all categories of servicemen. This requires constant improvement in training methods and procedures. One of the most effective means of troop training and indoctrination is military training and documentary films. Judging by the comments of trainees and teachers they are a great help in achieving better understanding of the training material.

The division of military training films of the Ministry of Defense engages in topical planning, organization of production, and use of moving pictures and slides in combat and political training for the personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. The division has a strong production base, the film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense and its branch. It has been making and independently distributing military training, popular science, and documentary films for 15 years and has had great success in this time.

More than 60 countries have taken part in the eight international military film festivals held at Versailles. Military training and documentary films made by the USSR Ministry of Defense studio have received high awards there: the Grand Prize "Great Golden Sun of Versailles" (twice) and the second prize "Silver Sun of Versailles" (once). No other military film studio in the world has received such an honor. The studio produces not only films on the design of weapons and combat equipment, training methods for subunits and units, tactics of waging combat actions, and general military regulations, but also documentaries on the history of the art of war and the history of the CPSU. These films are used most extensively in the educational process at military academies, higher and secondary military schools, and civilian higher educational institutions which have military training.

A series of documentary films dedicated to the past and present condition of the military districts appeared for the first time on the 50th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. These short films, in one or two parts, used material from the State Film Archive and frames showing episodes from troop life. They are suitable for showing not only at special sessions but also at garrison clubs and Houses of Officers as a "magazine" type short before artistic films. The short films "Order of Lenin Leningrad District," "Guarding the Skies of Moscow," and "You Have Been Called to Serve the Belorussian District" meet the objectives of military-patriotic indoctrination of young people very well.

The film "Red Banner North Caucasian District" contains a memorable sequence photographed at the memorial on Manayev Hill in Volgograd. The viewer sees the majestic Motherland monument. With sword in hand she calls her sons to defend the Fatherland. Suddenly a rank of soldiers appears followed by another and a third. With combat colors unfurled the officers and soldiers of the units and formations of the North Caucasian Red Banner Military District march solemnly down the granite steps. In profound silence they salute those who died in the battle for the freedom and independence of our Motherland and vow to serve their people faithfully.

"We vow," their words rise over the formation and this vow echoes with the vow of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War whose words are immortalized in the granite of the memorial.

In the 1970's the USSR Ministry of Defense film studio turned its attention to making full-length documentaries. One of them, "The Soviet Ground Forces," resurrects the history of the development of this glorious branch of the Armed Forces.

Films about the Great Patriotic War occupy a special place in the creative plans of the studio. A major film series on the principal events of the last war ("The Battle of Moscow," "The Battle of Stalingrad," "The Battle of Kursk," "The Belorussian Operation," "The Iassy-Kishinev Operation," "The Battle for the Dnepr," and "The Berlin Operation") and on the defeat of the Kwantoon Army in World War II has already been made on order from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. These films are enjoying well-deserved popularity among both military and civilian audiences, in particular young people and college students. New military historical films such as "The Liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine," "The Visla-Oder Operation," "The Small Land," and others are now being prepared for release.

Film chronicles of the war years are amazingly powerful and the documentary film makers today use this material skillfully. The film "The Rear of the Red Army During the Great Patriotic War," which was released in 1976, is an example. During its making the best episodes were selected from film chronicles of the work of rear agencies of Red Army and the labor heroism of the Soviet people in the rear on behalf of victory over the enemy. The preparation and conduct of each operation had distinctive characteristics, but one thing was always the same for the front and the rear: the guiding and directing role

of the CPSU. The film shows this well. It also shows truthfully how working people in the rear not only worked hard for 12-14 hours a day at their lathes, blast furnaces, and in the fields to provide the troops with everything they needed to live and fight, but also guarded their cities and towns with gun in hand, showing courage and heroism when required.

The interesting and instructive film "The Rear of the Red Army During the Great Patriotic War" was awarded the Gold Medal ineni A. P. Dovzhenko as the best documentary film on military patriotic topics in 1977.

In the future the film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense will be broadening the release of training and documentary films that summarize experience with command and control of troops during the Great Patriotic War and at postwar exercises. It is relevant here to say a few words about renting these films. The newspaper of the Northern Group of Forces ZNAMYA POBEDY recently ran short descriptions of artistic and some training and documentary film designated for work with warrant officers (praporshchiki) under a column heading "Films Received at the Film Center." It is very gratifying that the army press is propagandizing and helping disseminate military films, which are a very necessary and interesting aid in combat and political training. Unfortunately, however, such notices are still rare.

The new film catalog put together by the film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense and its branch for purposes of combat and political training for personnel of the Armed Forces includes more than 800 titles in different military specializations, not counting documentary and popular science subjects. In certain cases the film studio produces broad-screen films, but most of the material is done with 35-millimeter and 16-millimeter film.

In late 1977 the troops began receiving 16-millimeter film projectors for combat training purposes. This type of equipment is best suited for showing films in subunits and on naval ships which do not have special movie halls. This creates favorable conditions for formations and units to set up their own film files and makes it possible to broaden the use of films in troop combat and political training.

It should be observed that the use of this equipment at military schools and training centers, coupled with establishing their own film files and setting up places to show films, made it possible to virtually double the use of movies. They are used most extensively at the Kiev Higher Military Aviation Engineering School, where the students see more than 100 training and documentary films per school year. In addition to the general film library of the school, some departments also have their own film files for their own special programs. This illustrates that the film, as an effective teaching aid, is becoming increasingly popular with both trainees and teachers, which is entirely natural.

Unfortunately, information about new training films being received at film rental centers is poorly organized in some military districts. They have virtually no propaganda or advertising for films in the district and the press.

It seems to us that the combat training agencies of the districts and fleets should see that subordinate formations and units receive annotated lists of new films. We would like to see the newspapers and magazines run articles by commanders and political workers on questions of how to use films in practical troop training and indoctrination and comments by soldiers and sergeants about the best films, those that helped them perform the missions of combat and political training better.

The film is an effective means of army and navy troop indoctrination and training; each year films are used more widely. It would be desirable to establish direct contact between military film makers and audiences, to have the film studio of the USSR Ministry of Defense give reports on its creative work to the fighting men, and to organize premieres of new films with appearances by the screenwriters, directors, and photographers.

All these steps will help enhance the influence of the military film maker on the educational process at military schools and among the troops and raise the fighting effectiveness and general combat readiness of our glorious Armed Forces.

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READERS CONFERENCE AT THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 6, 1979 p 95

[Unattributed article: "At Readers Conferences"]

[Text] On 21 March of this year a conference of readers of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL was held at the Military Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution Red Banner Order of Suvorov Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. It was attended by more than 150 professors, teachers, and students. Lt Gen L. F. Kadatskiy, deputy chief of the academy, opened the conference.

Maj Gen V. A. Matsulenko, chief editor, spoke of the work of the journal in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress.

Speakers at the conference, including colonels A. M. Shapovalov, A. G. Khor'kov, N. A. Malyugin, and V. Ya. Proskurin, Lt Col L. I. Shamazov, and Capt V. A. Pron'ko, among others, observed that the journal does a great deal of useful work to treat the leadership role of the CPSU in military building and present timely questions of military history.

At the same time, participants in the conference had a number of remarks, suggestions, and requests to improve the quality of the material being published and enlarge the number of articles concerned with training methodology for the chief subjects of the program of history of the art of war at academies and schools. Readers of the journal recommended that more articles be published on the key problems of military historical science, on little-known operations and fighting, especially in the first period of the Great Patriotic War and in the Far Eastern theater, and exposing the aggressive essence of imperialism, Maoism, and Zionism. They asked to be notified of the topics of doctoral and candidate dissertations in military history and with the journal's working plan.

On 19 and 20 March readers conferences were held at the Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank-Artillery School and the Chelyabinsk Higher Military Automotive School. Lt Col A. I. Siderov, responsible secretary of the editorial board, spoke about the work of the journal in light of the decisions of the 25th party congress.

In their statements conference participants colonels V. I. Malev, F. I. Yakovenko, and P. S. Lonskiy, Lt Col M. N. Adonin, Maj Yu. A. Glotov, Captains V. A. Shal'gin and V. P. Solodovnik, cadet A. V. Yesinov, and Capt 1st Rank (Res) A. V. Aprel'kov praised the journal.

At the same time, the speakers expressed a wish to see more actual documents on the history of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars and the fraternal armies. They also ask the journal to bolster the heroic-patriotic subject area, show the mass heroism of the Soviet people in more striking and diverse fashion, reveal its sources, and tell more about little-known events of the Great Patriotic War, the feats of heroes at the front, and party political work in subunits in the post-war period.

The remarks and requests of participants at the readers conferences will be taken into account in drawing up editorial plans.

On 8 May 1979 a meeting with readers of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL was held in the garrison where Col P. V. Karatay is deputy garrison chief for political affairs. Adm (Ret) S. Ye. Zakharov and Lt Gen (Ret) K. F. Kalashnikov, members of the editorial board of the journal, spoke to the audience. They told about the problems being treated by the journal in light of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the principles of the new USSR Constitution, and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Further Improvement in Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." In addition, they recalled experiences from the war years and gave instructive examples of individual and mass heroism by fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy in the battle against the German fascist aggressors and Japanese militarists.

The soldiers of the garrison who spoke expressed gratitude to the representatives of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, awarded them a memorial address and memorial medals, and wished the editors and editorial board continued success in deciding the pressing problems of military historical science.

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